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Abstrat
We examine properties of a model of resoure alloation in whih several agents ex-
hange resoures in order to optimise their individual holdings. The shemes disussed re-
late to well-known negotiation protools proposed in earlier work and we onsider a number
of alternative notions of \rationality" overing both quantitative measures, e.g. ooperative
and individual rationality and more qualitative forms, e.g. Pigou-Dalton transfers. While
it is known that imposing partiular rationality and strutural restritions may result in
some realloations of the resoure set beoming unrealisable, in this paper we address the
issue of the number of restrited rational deals that may be required to implement a par-
tiular realloation when it is possible to do so. We onstrut examples showing that this
number may be exponential (in the number of resoures m), even when all of the agent
utility funtions are monotoni. We further show that k agents may ahieve in a single
deal a realloation requiring exponentially many rational deals if at most k   1 agents an
partiipate, this same realloation being unrealisable by any sequenes of rational deals in
whih at most k   2 agents are involved.
1. Introdution
Mehanisms for negotiating alloation of resoures within a group of agents form an im-
portant body of work within the study of multiagent systems. Typial abstrat models
derive from game-theoreti perspetives in eonomis and among the issues that have been
addressed are strategies that agents use to obtain a partiular subset of the resoures avail-
able, e.g. (Kraus, 2001; Rosenshein & Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm, 1999), and protools by
whih the proess of settling upon some alloation of resoures among the agents involved is
agreed, e.g. (Dignum & Greaves, 2000; Dunne, 2003; Dunne & MBurney, 2003; MBurney
et al., 2002).
The setting we are onerned with is enapsulated in the following denition.
Denition 1 A resoure alloation setting is dened by a triple hA;R;Ui where
A = fA
1
;A
2
; : : : ;A
n
g ; R = fr
1
; r
2
; : : : ; r
m
g
are, respetively, a set of (at least two) agents and a olletion of (non-shareable) resoures.
A utility funtion, u, is a mapping from subsets of R to rational values. Eah agent A
i
2 A
has assoiated with it a partiular utility funtion u
i
, so that U is hu
1
; u
2
; : : : ; u
n
i. An
alloation P of R to A is a partition hP
1
;P
2
; : : : ;P
n
i of R. The value u
i
(P
i
) is alled
the utility of the resoures assigned to A
i
. A utility funtion, u, is monotone if whenever
S  T it holds that u(S )  u(T ), i.e. the value assigned by u to any set of resoures, T ,
is never less than the value u attahes to any subset, S of T .
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Two major appliations in whih the abstrat view of Denition 1 has been exploited are
e-ommere and distributed task realisation. In the rst R represents some olletion of
ommodities oered for sale and individual agents seek to aquire a subset of these, the
\value" an agent attahes to a spei set being desribed by that agent's utility funtion.
In task planning, the \resoure" set desribes a olletion of sub-tasks to be performed in
order to realise some omplex task, e.g. the \omplex task" may be to transport goods
from a entral warehouse to some set of ities. In this example R desribes the loations
to whih goods must be dispathed and a given alloation denes those plaes to whih an
agent must arrange deliveries. The utility funtions in suh ases model the ost an agent
assoiates with arrying out its alloted sub-tasks.
Within the very general ontext of Denition 1, a number of issues arise stemming from
the observation that it is unlikely that some initial alloation will be seen as satisfatory
either with respet to the views of all agents in the system or with respet to divers global
onsiderations. Thus, by proposing hanges to the initial assignment individual agents
seek to obtain a \better" alloation. This senario raises two immediate questions: how to
evaluate a given partition and thus have a basis for forming improved or optimal alloations;
and, the issue underlying the main results of this paper, what restritions should be imposed
on the form that proposed deals may take.
We shall subsequently review some of the more widely studied approahes to dening
onditions under whih some alloations are seen as \better" than others. For the purposes
of this introdution we simply observe that suh riteria may be either quantitative or
qualitative in nature. As an example of the former we have the approah wherein the
\value" of an alloation P is simply the sum of the values given by the agents' utility
funtions to the subsets of R they have been apportioned within P , i.e.
P
n
i=1
u
i
(P
i
): this
is the so-alled utilitarian soial welfare, whih to avoid repetition we will denote by 
u
(P).
A natural aim for agents within a ommodity trading ontext is to seek an alloation under
whih 
u
is maximised. One example of a qualitative riterion is \envy freeness": informally,
an alloation, P , is envy-free if no agent assigns greater utility to the resoure set (P
j
) held
by another agent than it does with respet to the resoure set (P
i
) it has atually been
alloated, i.e. for eah distint pair hi ; j i, u
i
(P
i
)  u
i
(P
j
).
In very general terms there are two approahes that have been onsidered in treating the
question of how a nite olletion of resoures might be distributed among a set of agents
in order to optimise some riterion of interest: \ontrat-net" based methods, e.g. (Dunne
et al., 2003; Endriss et al., 2003; Endriss & Maudet, 2004b; Sandholm, 1998, 1999) deriving
from the work of Smith (1980); and \ombinatorial autions", e.g. (Parkes & Ungar, 2000a,
2000b; Sandholm et al., 2001; Sandholm, 2002; Sandholm & Suri, 2003; Tennenholz, 2000;
Yokoo et al., 2004, amongst others). The signiant dierene between these is in the extent
to whih a entralized ontrolling agent determines the eventual distribution of resoures
among agents.
One may view the strategy underlying ombinatorial autions as investing the omputa-
tional eort into a \pre-proessing" stage following whih a given alloation is determined.
Thus a ontrolling agent (the \autioneer") is supplied with a set of bids { pairs hS
j
; p
j
i
wherein S
j
is some subset of the available resoures and p
j
the prie agent A
j
is prepared
to pay in order to aquire S
j
. The problem faed by the autioneer is to deide whih bids
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to aept in order to maximise the overall prot subjet to the onstraint that eah item
an be obtained by at most one agent.
What we shall refer to as \ontrat-net shemes" typially eshew the preomputation
stage and subordination to a ontrolling arbiter employed in aution mehanisms, seeking
instead to realise a suitable alloation by an agreed sequene of deals. The ontrat-net (in
its most general instantiation) for senarios of m resoures distributed among n agents is
the omplete direted graph with n
m
verties (eah of whih is assoiated with a distint
alloation). In this way a possible deal hP ;Qi is represented as an edge direted from the
vertex labelled with P to that labelled Q . Viewed thus, identifying a sequene of deals an
be interpreted as a searh proess whih, in priniple, individual agents may ondut in an
autonomous fashion.
Centralized shemes an be eetive in ontexts where the partiipants ooperate (in
the sense of aepting the autioneer's arbritration). In environments within whih agents
are highly self-interested to the extent that their aims onit with the aution proess or
in whih there is a high degree of \unertainty" about the outome, in working towards a
nal alloation, the agents involved may only be prepared to proeed \autiously": that is,
an agent will only aept a proposed realloation if satised that suh would result in an
immediate improvement from its own perspetive. In suh ases, the proess of moving from
the initial alloation, P
init
, to the eventual realloation P
n
is by a sequene of loal rational
deals, e.g. an agent might refuse to aept deals whih redued 
u
beause of the possibility
that it suers an unompensated loss in utility. A key issue here is the following: if the deal
protool allows only moves in whih at eah stage some agent A
j
oers a single resoure to
another agent A
j
then the rational realloation hP
init
;P
n
i an always be implemented; if,
however, every single move must be \rational" then hP
init
;P
n
i may not be realisable.
We may, informally, regard the view of suh agents as \myopi", in the sense that they
are unwilling to aept a \short-term loss" (a deal hP ;Qi under they might inur a loss of
utility) despite the prospet of a \long-term gain" (assuming 
u
(P
n
) > 
u
(P
init
) holds).
There are a number of reasons why an agent may adopt suh views, e.g. onsider the
following simple protool for agreeing a realloation.
A realloation of resoures is agreed over a sequene of stages, eah of whih
involves ommuniation between two agents, A
i
and A
j
. This ommuniation
onsists of A
i
issuing a proposal to A
j
of the form (buy ; r ; p), oering to purhase
r from A
j
for a payment of p; or (sell ; r ; p), oering to transfer r to A
j
in return
for a payment p. The response from A
j
is simply aept (following whih the
deal is implemented) or rejet .
This, of ourse, is a very simple negotiation struture, however onsider its operation within
a two agent setting in whih one agent, A
1
say, wishes to bring about an alloation P
n
(and thus an devise a plan { sequene of deals { to realise this from an initial alloation
P
init
) while the other agent, A
2
, does not know P
n
. In addition, assume that A
1
is the only
agent that makes proposals and that a nal alloation is xed either when A
1
is \satised"
or as soon as A
2
rejets any oer.
While A
2
ould be better o if P
n
is realised, it may be the ase that the only proposals
A
2
will aept are those under whih it does not lose, e.g. some agents may be septial
about the bona des of others and will aept only deals from whih they an pereive an
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immediate benet. There are several reasons why an agent may embrae suh attitudes
within the shema outlined: one a deal has been implemented A
2
may lose utility but no
further proposals are made by A
1
so that the loss is \permanent". We note that even if we
enrih the basi protool so that A
1
an desribe P
n
, A
2
may still rejet oers under whih
it suers a loss, sine it is unwilling to rely on the subsequent deals that would ameliorate
its loss atually being proposed. Although the position taken by A
2
in the setting just
desribed may appear unduly autious, we would laim that it does reet \real" behaviour
in ertain ontexts. Outside the arena of automated alloation and negotiation in multiagent
systems, there are many examples of ations by individuals where promised long-term gains
are insuÆient to engender the aeptane of short term loss. Consider \hain letter"
shemes (or their more subtle manifestation as \pyramid selling" enterprises): suh have
a natural lifetime bounded by the size of the population in whih they irulate, but may
break down before this is reahed. Faed with a request to \send $10 to the ve names at
the head of the list and forward the letter to ten others after adding your name" despite the
possibility of signiant gain after a temporary loss of $50, to ignore suh blandishments is
not seen as overly septial and autious: there may be relutane to aept that one will
eventually reeive suÆient reompense in return and suspiion that the name order has
been manipulated.
In summary, we an identify two important inuenes that lead to ontexts in whih
agents prefer to move towards a realloation via a sequene of \rational" deals. Firstly,
the agents are self-interested but operating in an unstable environment, e.g. in the \hain
letter" setting, an agent annot reliably predit the exat point at whih the hain will fail.
The seond fator is that omputational restritions may limit the deisions an individual
agent an make about whether or not to aept a proposed deal. For example in settings
where all deals involve one resoure at a time, A
2
may rejet a proposal to aept some
resoure, r , sine r is only \useful" following a further sequene of deals: if this number
of further deals is \small" then A
2
ould deide to aept the proposed deal sine it has
suÆient omputational power to determine that there is a ontext in whih r is of value;
if this number is \large" however, then A
2
may lak suÆient power to san the searh
spae of future possibilities that would allow it to aept r . Notie that in the extreme
ase, A
2
makes its deision solely on whether r is of immediate use, i.e. A
2
is myopi. A
more powerful A
2
may be able to onsider whether r is useful should up to k further deals
take plae: in this ase, A
2
ould still refuse to aept r sine, although of use, A
2
annot
determine this with a bounded look ahead.
In total for the senario we have desribed, if A
1
wishes to bring about an alloation P
n
then faed with the view adopted by A
2
and the limitations imposed by the deal protool,
the only \eetive plan" that A
1
ould adopt is to nd a sequene of rational deals to
propose to A
2
.
Our aim in this artile is to show that ombining \strutural" restritions (e.g. only one
resoure at a time is involved in a loal realloation) with rationality restritions an result
in settings in whih any sequene to realise a realloation hP ;Qi must involve exponentially
many (in jRj) separate stages. We rene these ideas in the next sub-setion.
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1.1 Preliminary Denitions
To begin, we rst formalise the onepts of deal and ontrat path.
Denition 2 Let hA;R;Ui be a resoure alloation setting. A deal is a pair hP ;Qi where
P = hP
1
; : : : ;P
n
i and Q = hQ
1
; : : : ;Q
n
i are distint partitions of R. The eet of imple-
menting the deal hP ;Qi is that the alloation of resoures speied by P is replaed with that
speied by Q. Following the notation of (Endriss & Maudet, 2004b) for a deal Æ = hP ;Qi,
we use A
Æ
to indiate the subset of A involved, i.e. A
k
2 A
Æ
if and only if P
k
6= Q
k
.
Let Æ = hP ;Qi be a deal. A ontrat path realising Æ is a sequene of alloations
 = hP
(1)
; P
(2)
; : : : ; P
(t 1)
; P
(t)
i
in whih P = P
(1)
and P
(t)
= Q. The length of , denoted jj is t   1, i.e. the number of
deals in .
There are two methods whih we an use to redue the number of deals that a single
agent may have to onsider in seeking to move from some alloation to another, thereby
avoiding the need to hoose from exponentially many alternatives: strutural and rationality
onstraints. Strutural onstraints limit the permitted deals to those whih bound the
number of resoures and/or the number of agents involved, but take no onsideration of the
view any agent may have as to whether its alloation has improved. In ontrast, rationality
onstraints restrit deals hP ;Qi to those in whih Q \improves" upon P aording to
partiular riteria. In this artile we onsider two lasses of strutural onstraint: O -
ontrats, dened and onsidered in (Sandholm, 1998), and what we shall refer to as M (k)-
ontrats.
Denition 3 Let Æ = hP ;Qi be a deal involving a realloation of R among A.
a. Æ is a one ontrat (O-ontrat) if
O1. A
Æ
= fi ; jg.
O2. There is a unique resoure r 2 P
i
[P
j
for whih Q
i
= P
i
[frg and Q
j
= P
j
nfrg
(with r 2 P
j
) or Q
j
= P
j
[ frg and Q
i
= P
i
n frg (with r 2 P
i
)
b. For a value k  2, the deal Æ = hP ;Qi is an M (k)-ontrat if 2  jA
Æ
j  k and
[
i2A
Æ
Q
i
= [
i2A
Æ
P
i
.
Thus, O -ontrats involve the transfer of exatly one resoure from a partiular agent to
another, resulting in the number of deals ompatible with any given alloation being exatly
(n   1)m: eah of the m resoures an be reassigned from its urrent owner to any of the
other n   1 agents.
Rationality onstraints arise in a number of dierent ways. For example, from the
standpoint of an individual agent A
i
a given deal hP ;Qi may have three dierent outomes:
u
i
(P
i
) < u
i
(Q
i
), i.e. A
i
values the alloation Q
i
as superior to P
i
; u
i
(P
i
) = u
i
(Q
i
), i.e.
A
i
is indierent between P
i
and Q
i
; and u
i
(P
i
) > u
i
(Q
i
), i.e. A
i
is worse o after the
deal. When global optima suh as utilitarian soial welfare are to be maximised, there is
the question of what inentive there is for any agent to aept a deal hP ;Qi under whih it
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is left with a less valuable resoure holding. The standard approah to this latter question
is to introdue the notion of a pay-o funtion, i.e. in order for A
i
to aept a deal under
whih it suers a redution in utility, A
i
reeives some payment suÆient to ompensate
for its loss. Of ourse suh ompensation must be made by other agents in the system who
in providing it do not wish to pay in exess of any gain. In dening notions of pay-o the
interpretation is that in any transation eah agent A
i
makes a payment, 
i
: if 
i
< 0
then A
i
is given  
i
in return for aepting a deal; if 
i
> 0 then A
i
ontributes 
i
to the
amount to be distributed among those agents whose pay-o is negative.
This notion of \sensible transfer" is aptured by the onept of individual rationality,
and is often dened in terms of an appropriate pay-o vetor existing. It is not diÆult,
however, to show that suh denitions are equivalent to the following.
Denition 4 A deal hP ;Qi is individually rational (IR) if and only if 
u
(Q) > 
u
(P).
We shall onsider alternative bases for rationality onstraints later: these are primarily of
interest within so-alled money free settings (so that ompensatory payment for a loss in
utility is not an option).
The entral issue of interest in this paper onerns the properties of the ontrat-net
graph when the allowed deals must satisfy both a strutural and a rationality onstraint.
Thus, if we onsider arbitrary prediates  on deals hP ;Qi { where the ases of interest are
 ombining a strutural and rationality ondition { we have,
Denition 5 For  a prediate over distint pairs of alloations, a ontrat path
hP
(1)
; P
(2)
; : : : ; P
(t 1)
; P
(t)
i
realising hP ;Qi is a -path if for eah 1  i < t , hP
(i)
;P
(i+1)
i is a -deal, that is
(P
(i)
;P
(i+1)
) holds. We say that  is omplete if any deal Æ may be realised by a -path.
We, further, say that  is omplete with respet to 	-deals (where 	 is a prediate over
distint pairs of alloations) if any deal Æ for whih 	(Æ) holds may be realised by a -path.
The main interest in earlier studies of these ideas has been in areas suh as identifying
neessary and/or suÆient onditions on deals to be omplete with respet to partiular
riteria, e.g. (Sandholm, 1998); and in establishing \onvergene" and termination proper-
ties, e.g. Endriss et al. (2003), Endriss and Maudet (2004b) onsider deal types, , suh
that every maximal
1
-path ends in a Pareto optimal alloation, i.e. one in whih any
realloation under whih some agent improves its utility will lead to another agent suering
a loss. Sandholm (1998) examines how restritions e.g. with (P ;Q) = > if and only if
hP ;Qi is an O -ontrat, may aet the existene of ontrat paths to realise deals. Of
partiular interest, from the viewpoint of heuristis for exploring the ontrat-net graph,
are ases where (P ;Q) = > if and only if the deal hP ;Qi is individually rational. For the
ase of O -ontrats the following are known:
Theorem 1
a. O-ontrats are omplete.
1. \Maximal" in the sense that if hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i is suh a path, then for every alloation, Q , (P
(t)
;Q)
does not hold.
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b. IR O-ontrats are not omplete with respet to IR deals.
In the onsideration of algorithmi and omplexity issues presented in (Dunne et al., 2003)
one diÆulty with attempting to formulate realloation plans by rational O -ontrats is
already apparent, that is:
Theorem 2 Even in the ase n = 2 and with monotone utility funtions the problem of
deiding if an IR O-ontrat path exists to realise the IR deal hP ;Qi is np{hard.
Thus deiding if any rational plan is possible is already omputationally hard. In this
artile we demonstrate that, even if an appropriate rational plan exists, in extreme ases,
there may be signiant problems: the number of deals required ould be exponential in
the number of resoures, so aeting both the time it will take for the shema outlined to
onlude and the spae that an agent will have to dediate to storing it. Thus in his proof
of Theorem 1 (b), Sandholm observes that when an IR O -ontrat path exists for a given
IR deal, it may be the ase that its length exeeds m, i.e. some agent passes a resoure to
another and then aepts the same resoure at a later stage.
The typial form of the results that we derive an be summarised as:
For  a strutural onstraint (O -ontrat or M (k)-ontrat) and 	 a rationality
onstraint, e.g. 	(P ;Q) holds if hP ;Qi is individually rational, there are re-
soure alloation settings hA
n
;R
m
;Ui in whih there is a deal hP ;Qi satisfying
all of the following.
a. hP ;Qi is a 	-deal.
b. hP ;Qi an be realised by a ontrat path on whih every deal satises the
strutural onstraint  and the rationality onstraint 	.
. Every suh ontrat path has length at least g(m).
For example, we show that there are instanes for whih the shortest IR O -ontrat path has
length exponential in m.
2
In the next setion we will be interested in lower bounds on the
values of the following funtions: we introdue these in general terms to avoid unneessary
subsequent repetition.
Denition 6 Let hA;R;Ui be a resoure alloation setting. Additionally let  and 	 be
two prediates on deals. For a deal Æ = hP ;Qi the partial funtion L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;)
is the length of the shortest -ontrat path realising hP ;Qi if suh a path exists (and is
undened if no suh path is possible). The partial funtion L
max
(hA;R;Ui;;	) is
L
max
(hA;R;Ui;;	) = max
	-deals Æ
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;)
Finally, the partial funtion 
max
(n;m;;	) is

max
(n;m;;	) = max
U=hu
1
;u
2
;:::;u
n
i
L
max
(hA
n
;R
m
;Ui;;	)
where onsideration is restrited to those 	-deals Æ = hP ;Qi for whih a realising -path
exists.
2. Sandholm (1998) gives an upper bound on the length of suh paths whih is also exponential in m, but
does not expliitly state any lower bound other than that already referred to.
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The three measures, L
opt
, L
max
and 
max
distinguish dierent aspets regarding the length
of ontrat-paths. The funtion L
opt
is onerned with -paths realising a single deal hP ;Qi
in a given resoure alloation setting hA;R;Ui: the property of interest being the number
of deals in the shortest, i.e. optimal length, -path. We stress that L
opt
is a partial funtion
whose value is undened in the event that hP ;Qi annot be realised by a -path in the
setting hA;R;Ui. The funtion L
max
is dened in terms of L
opt
, again in the ontext of
a spei resoure alloation setting. The behaviour of interest for L
max
, however, is not
simply the length of -paths realising a spei hP ;Qi but the \worst-ase" value of L
opt
for deals whih are 	-deals. We note the qualiation that L
max
is dened only for 	-deals
that are apable of being realised by -paths, and thus do not onsider ases for whih no
appropriate ontrat path exists. Thus, if it should be the ase that no 	-deal in the setting
hA;R;Ui an be realised by a -path then the value L
max
(hA;R;Ui;;	) is undened, i.e.
L
max
is also a partial funtion. We may interpret any upper bound on L
max
in the following
terms: if L
max
(hA;R;Ui;;	)  K then any 	-deal for whih a -path exists an be
realised by a -path of length at most K .
Our main interest will entre on 
max
whih is onerned with the behaviour of L
max
as
a funtion of n and m and ranges over all n-tuples of utility funtions hu : 2
R
! Qi
n
. Our
approah to obtaining lower bounds for this funtion is onstrutive, i.e. for eah h;	i
that is onsidered, we show how the utility funtions U may be dened in a setting with m
resoures so as to yield a lower bound on 
max
(n;m;;	). In ontrast to the measures L
opt
and L
max
, the funtion 
max
is not desribed in terms of a single xed resoure alloation
setting. It is, however, still a partial funtion: depending on hn;m;;	i it may be the ase
that in every n agent, m resoure alloation setting, regardless of whih hoie of utility
funtions is made, there is no 	-deal, hP ;Qi apable of being realised by -path, and for
suh ases the value of 
max
(n;m;;	) will be undened.
3
It is noted, at this point, that the denition of 
max
allows arbitrary utility funtions
to be employed in onstruting \worst-ase" instanes. While this is reasonable in terms
of general lower bound results, as will be apparent from the given onstrutions the utility
funtions atually employed are highly artiial (and unlikely to feature in \real" appliation
settings). We shall attempt to address this objetion by further onsidering bounds on the
following variant of 
max
:

max
mono
(n;m;;	) = max
U=hu
1
;u
2
;:::;u
n
i : eah u
i
is monotone
L
max
(hA
n
;R
m
;Ui;;	)
Thus, 
max
mono
deals with resoure alloation settings within whih all of the utility funtions
must satisfy a monotoniity onstraint.
The main results of this artile are presented in the next setions. We onsider two
general lasses of ontrat path: O -ontrat paths under various rationality onditions in
3. In reognising the possibility that 
max
(n;m;;	) ould be undened, we are not laiming that suh
behaviour arises with any of the instantiations of h;	i onsidered subsequently: in fat it will be
lear from the onstrutions that, denoting by 
max
;	
(n;m) the funtion 
max
(n;m;;	) for a xed
instantiation of h;	i, with the restrited deal types and rationality onditions examined, the funtion

max
;	
(n;m) is a total funtion. Whether it is possible to formulate \sensible" hoies of h;	i with
whih 
max
;	
(n;m) is undened for some values of hn;mi (and, if so, demonstrating examples of suh) is,
primarily, only a question of ombinatorial interest, whose development is not entral to the onerns of
the urrent artile.
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Setion 2; and, similarly, M (k)-ontrat paths for arbitrary values of k  2 in Setion 3.
Our results are onerned with the onstrution of resoure alloation settings hA;R
m
;Ui
for whih given some rationality requirement, e.g. that deals be individually rational, there
is some deal hP ;Qi that satises the rationality ondition, an be realised by a rational
O -ontrat path (respetively, M (k)-ontrat path), but with the number of deals required
by suh paths being exponential in m. We additionally obtain slightly weaker (but still
exponential) lower bounds for rational O -ontrat paths within settings of monotone utility
funtions, i.e. for the measure 
max
mono
, outlining how similar results may be derived for
M (k)-ontrat paths.
In the resoure alloation settings onstruted for demonstrating these properties with
M (k)-ontrat paths, the onstruted deal hP ;Qi is realisable with a single M (k + 1)-
ontrat but unrealisable by any rational M (k  1)-ontrat path. We disuss related work,
in partiular the reent study of (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a) that addresses similar issues
to those onsidered in the present artile, in Setion 4. Conlusions and some diretions for
further work are presented in the nal setion.
2. Lower Bounds on Path Length { O-ontrats
In this setion we onsider the issue of ontrat path length when the strutural restrition
requires individual deals to be O -ontrats. We rst give an overview of the onstrution
method, with the following subsetions analysing the ases of unrestrited utility funtions
and, subsequently, monotone utility funtions.
2.1 Overview
The strategy employed in proving our results involves two parts: for a given lass of re-
strited ontrat paths we proeed as follows in obtaining lower bounds on 
max
(n;m;;	).
a. For the ontrat-net graph partitioning m resoures among n agents, onstrut a
path, 
m
= hP
(1)
; P
(2)
; : : : ; P
(t)
i realising a deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i. For the strutural
onstraint, 
0
inuening  it is then proved that:
a1. The ontrat path 
m
is a 
0
-path, i.e. for eah 1  i < t , the deal hP
(i)
;P
(i+1
i
satises the strutural onstraint 
0
.
a2. For any pair of alloations P
(i)
and P
(i+j )
ourring in 
m
, if j  2 then the
deal hP
(i)
;P
(i+j )
i is not a 
0
-deal.
Thus (a1) ensures that 
m
is a suitable ontrat path, while (a2) will guarantee that
there is exatly one alloation, P
(i+1)
, that an be reahed within 
m
from any given
alloation P
(i)
in 
m
by means of a 
0
-deal.
b. Dene utility funtions U
n
= hu
1
; : : : ; u
n
i with the following properties
b1. The deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i is a 	-deal.
b2. For the rationality onstraint, 
00
inuening , every deal hP
(i)
;P
(i+1)
i is a

00
-deal.
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b3. For every alloation P
(i)
in the ontrat path  and every alloation Q other
than P
(i+1)
the deal hP
(i)
;Qi is not a -deal, i.e. it violates either the stutural
onstraint 
0
or the rationality onstraint 
00
.
Thus, (a1) and (b2) ensure that hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i has a dened value with respet to the
funtion L
opt
for the 	-deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i, i.e. a -path realising the deal is possible.
The properties given by (a2) and (b3) indiate that (within the onstruted resoure
alloation setting) the path 
m
is the unique -path realising hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i. It follows
that t  1, the length of this path, gives a lower bound on the value of L
max
and hene
a lower bound on 
max
(n;m;;	).
Before ontinuing it will be useful to x some notational details.
We useH
m
to denote them-dimensional hyperube. Interpreted as a direted graph,H
m
has 2
m
verties eah of whih is identied with a distint m-bit label. Using  = a
1
a
2
: : : a
m
to denote an arbitrary suh label, the edges of H
m
are formed by
f h; i :  and  dier in exatly one bit positiong
We identify m-bit labels  = a
1
a
2
: : : a
m
with subsets S

of R
m
, via r
i
2 S

if and only if
a
i
= 1. Similarly, any subset S of R an be desribed by a binary word, (S ), of length m,
i.e. (S ) = b
1
b
2
: : : b
m
with b
i
= 1 if and only if r
i
2 S . For a label  we use jj to denote
the number of bits with value 1, so that jj is the size of the subset S

. If  and  are m-bit
labels, then  is a 2m-bit label, so that if R
m
and T
m
are disjoint sets, then  desribes
the union of the subset S

of R
m
with the subset S

of T
m
. Finally if  = a
1
a
2
: : : a
m
is an m-bit label then  denotes the label formed by hanging all 0 values in  to 1 and
vie versa. In this way, if S

is the subset of R
m
desribed by  then  desribes the set
R
m
n S

. To avoid an exess of supersripts we will, where no ambiguity arises, use  both
to denote the m-bit label and the subset of R
m
desribed by it, e.g. we write    rather
than S

 S

.
For n = 2 the ontrat-net graph indued by O -ontrats an be viewed as the m-
dimensional hyperube H
m
: the m-bit label,  assoiated with a vertex of H
m
desribing
the alloation h; i to hA
1
;A
2
i. In this way the set of IR O -ontrats dene a subgraph,
G
m
of H
m
with any direted path from (P) to (Q) in G
m
orresponding to a possible IR
O -ontrat path from the alloation hP ;R n Pi to the alloation hQ ;R nQi.
2.2 O-ontrat Paths { Unrestrited Utility Funtions
Our rst result laries one issue in the presentation of (Sandholm, 1998, Proposition 2):
in this an upper bound that is exponential in m is proved on the length of IR O -ontrat
paths, i.e. in terms of our notation, (Sandholm, 1998, Proposition 2) establishes an upper
bound on 
max
(n;m;;	). We now prove a similar order lower bound.
Theorem 3 Let (P ;Q) be the prediate whih holds whenever hP ;Qi is an IR O-ontrat
and 	(P ;Q) that whih holds whenever hP ;Qi is IR. For m  7

max
(2;m;;	) 

77
256

2
m
  2
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Proof. Consider a path C = h
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
t
i in H
m
, with the following property
4
8 1  i < j  t (j  i + 2) ) (
i
and 
j
dier in at least 2 positions) (SC)
e.g. if m = 4 then
;; fr
1
g; fr
1
; r
3
g; fr
1
; r
2
; r
3
g; fr
2
; r
3
g; fr
2
; r
3
; r
4
g; fr
2
; r
4
g; fr
1
; r
2
; r
4
g
is suh a path as it orresponds to the sequene h0000; 1000; 1010; 1110; 0110; 0111; 0101; 1101i.
Choose C
(m)
to be a longest suh path with this property that ould be formed in H
m
,
letting 
m
= hP
(1)
;P
(2)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i be the sequene of alloations with P
(i)
= h
i
; 
i
i. We
now dene the utility funtions u
1
and u
2
so that for   R
m
,
u
1
() + u
2
() =
(
k if  = 
k
0 if  62 f
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
t
g
With this hoie, the ontrat path 
m
desribes the unique IR O -ontrat path realising
the IR deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i: that 
m
is an IR O -ontrat path is immediate, sine

u
(P
(i+1)
) = i + 1 > i = 
u
(P
(i)
)
That it is unique follows from the fat that for all 1  i  t and i + 2  j  t , the deal
hP
(i)
;P
(j )
i is not an O -ontrat (hene there are no \short-uts" possible), and for eah
P
(i)
there is exatly one IR O -ontrat that an follow it, i.e. P
(i+1)
.
5
From the preeding argument it follows that any lower bound on the length of C
(m)
,
i.e. a sequene satisfying the ondition (SC), is a lower bound on 
max
(2;m;;	). These
paths in H
m
were originally studied by Kautz (1958) in the ontext of oding theory and
the lower bound on their length of (77=256)2
m
  2 established in (Abbott & Kathalski,
1991). 2
Example 1 Using the path
C
(4)
= h0000; 1000; 1010; 1110; 0110; 0111; 0101; 1101i
= h
1
; 
2
; 
3
; 
4
; 
5
; 
6
; 
7
; 
8
i
in the resoure alloation setting hfa
1
; a
2
g; fr
1
; r
2
; r
3
; r
4
g; hu
1
; u
2
ii, if the utility funtions
are speied as in Table 1 below then 
u
(h
1
; 
1
i) = 1 and 
u
(h
8
; 
8
i) = 8. Furthermore,
C
(4)
desribes the unique IR O-ontrat path realising the realloation hh
1
; 
1
i; h
8
; 
8
ii
There are a number of alternative formulations of \rationality" whih an also be onsidered.
For example
Denition 7 Let Æ = hP ;Qi be a deal.
4. This denes the so-alled \snake-in-the-box" odes introdued in (Kautz, 1958).
5. In our example with m = 4, the sequene h0000; 1000; 1001; 1101i, although dening an O-ontrat path
gives rise to a deal whih is not IR, namely that orresponding to h1000; 1001i.
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S R n S u
1
(S ) u
2
(R n S ) 
u
S R n S u
1
(S ) u
2
(R n S ) 
u
0000 1111 1 0 1 
1
1000 0111 1 1 2 
2
0001 1110 0 0 0 1001 0110 0 0 0
0010 1101 0 0 0 1010 0101 2 1 3 
3
0011 1100 0 0 0 1011 0100 0 0 0
0100 1011 0 0 0 1100 0011 0 0 0
0101 1010 4 3 7 
7
1101 0010 4 4 8 
8
0110 1001 3 2 5 
5
1110 0001 2 2 4 
4
0111 1000 3 3 6 
6
1111 0000 0 0 0
Table 1: Utility funtion denitions for m = 4 example.
a. Æ is ooperatively rational if for every agent, A
i
, u
i
(Q
i
)  u
i
(P
i
) and there is at least
one agent, A
j
, for whom u
j
(Q
j
) > u
j
(P
j
).
b. Æ is equitable if min
i2A
Æ
u
i
(Q
i
) > min
i2A
Æ
u
i
(P
i
).
. Æ is a Pigou-Dalton deal if A
Æ
= fi ; jg, u
i
(P
i
) + u
j
(P
j
) = u
i
(Q
i
) + u
j
(Q
j
) and
ju
i
(Q
i
)  u
j
(Q
j
)j < ju
i
(P
i
)  u
j
(P
j
)j (where j : : : j is absolute value).
There are a number of views we an take onerning the rationality onditions given in Def-
inition 7. One shared feature is that, unlike the onept of individual rationality for whih
some provision to ompensate agents who suer a loss in utility is needed, i.e. individual
rationality presumes a \money-based" system, the forms dened in Denition 7 allow on-
epts of \rationality" to be given in \money-free" enviroments. Thus, in a ooperatively
rational deal, no agent involved suers a loss in utility and at least one is better o. It may
be noted that given the haraterisation of Denition 4 it is immediate that any oopera-
tively rational deal is perfore also individually rational; the onverse, however, learly does
not hold in general. In some settings, an equitable deal may be neither ooperatively nor
individually rational. One may interpret suh deals as one method of reduing inequality
between the values agents plae on their alloations: for those involved in an equitable deal,
it is ensured that the agent who plaes least value on their urrent alloation will obtain a
resoure set whih is valued more highly. It may, of ourse, be the ase that some agents
suer a loss of utility: the ondition for a deal to be equitable limits how great suh a loss
ould be. Finally the onept of Pigou-Dalton deal originates from and has been studied in
depth within the theory of exhange eonomies. This is one of many approahes that have
been proposed, again in order to desribe deals whih redue inequality between members
of an agent soiety, e.g. (Endriss & Maudet, 2004b). In terms of the denition given,
suh deals enapsulate the so-alled Pigou-Dalton priniple in eonomi theory: that any
transfer of inome from a wealthy individual to a poorer one should redue the disparity
between them. We note that, in priniple, we ould dene related rationality onepts
based on several extensions of this priniple that have been suggested, e.g. (Atkinson, 1970;
Chateauneaf et al., 2002; Kolm, 1976).
Using the same O -ontrat path onstruted in Theorem 3, we need only vary the
denitions of the utility funtions employed in order to obtain,
Corollary 1 For eah of the ases below,
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a. (Æ) holds if and only if Æ is a ooperatively rational O-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is ooperatively rational.
b. (Æ) holds if and only if Æ is an equitable O-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is equitable.
. (Æ) holds if and only if Æ is a Pigou-Dalton O-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is a Pigou-Dalton deal.

max
(2;m;;	) 

77
256

2
m
  2
Proof. We employ exatly the same sequene of alloations 
m
desribed in the proof of
Theorem 3 but modify the utility funtions hu
1
; u
2
i for eah ase.
a. Choose hu
1
; u
2
i with u
2
() = 0 for all   R and
u
1
() =
(
k if  = 
k
0 if  62 f
1
; : : : ; 
t
g
The resulting O -ontrat path is ooperatively rational: the utility enjoyed by A
2
re-
mains onstant while that enjoyed by A
1
inreases by 1 with eah deal. Any deviation
from this ontrat path (employing an alternative O -ontrat) will result in a loss of
utility for A
1
.
b. Choose hu
1
; u
2
i with u
2
() = u
1
() and
u
1
() =
(
k if  = 
k
0 if  62 f
1
; : : : ; 
t
g
The O -ontrat path is equitable: both A
1
and A
2
inrease their respetive utility
values by 1 with eah deal. Again, any O -ontrat deviating from this will result in
both agents losing some utility.
. Choose hu
1
; u
2
i as
u
1
() =
(
k if  = 
k
0 if  62 f
1
; : : : ; 
t
g
; u
2
() =
(
2
m
  k if  = 
k
2
m
if  62 f
1
; : : : ; 
t
g
To see that the O -ontrat path onsists of Pigou-Dalton deals, it suÆes to note that
u
1
(
i
) + u
2
(
i
) = 2
m
for eah 1  i  t . In addition, ju
2
(
i+1
)  u
1
(
i+1
)j = 2
m
  2i   2
whih is stritly less than ju
2
(
i
) u
1
(
i
)j = 2
m
 2i . Finally, any O -ontrat hP ;Qi whih
deviates from this sequene will not be a Pigou-Dalton deal sine
ju
2
(Q
2
)  u
1
(Q
1
)j = 2
m
> ju
2
(P
2
)  u
1
(P
1
)j
whih violates one of the onditions required of Pigou-Dalton deals. 2
The onstrution for two agent settings, easily extends to larger numbers.
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Corollary 2 For eah of the hoies of h;	i onsidered in Theorem 3 and Corollary 1,
and all n  2,

max
(n;m;;	) 

77
256

2
m
  2
Proof. Fix alloations in whih A
1
is given 
1
, A
2
alloated 
1
, and A
j
assigned ; for eah
3  j  n. Using idential utility funtions hu
1
; u
2
i as in eah of the previous ases, we
employ for u
j
: u
j
(;) = 1, u
j
(S ) = 0 whenever S 6= ; (h;	i as in Theorem 3); u
j
(S ) = 0 for
all S (Corollary 1(a)); u
j
(;) = 2
m
, u
j
(S ) = 0 whenever S 6= ; (Corollary 1(b)); and, nally,
u
j
(S ) = 2
m
for all S , (Corollary 1()). Considering a realisation of the 	-deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i
the only -ontrat path admissible is the path 
m
dened in the related proofs. This gives
the lower bound stated. 2
We note, at this point, some other onsequenes of Corollary 1 with respet to (Endriss &
Maudet, 2004b, Theorems 1, 3), whih state
Fat 1 We reall that a -path, hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i is maximal if for eah alloation Q, hP
(t)
;Qi
is not a -deal.
a. If hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i is any maximal path of ooperatively rational deals then P
(t)
is
Pareto optimal.
b. If hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i is any maximal path of equitable deals then P
(t)
maximises the
value 
e
(P) = min
1in
u
i
(P
i
), i.e. the so-alled egalitarian soial welfare.
The sequene of ooperatively rational deals in Corollary 1(a) terminates in the Pareto
optimal alloation P
(t)
: the alloation for A
2
always has utility 0 and there is no alloation
to A
1
whose utility an exeed t . Similarly, the sequene of equitable deals in Corollary 1(b)
terminates in the alloation P
(t)
, for whih 
e
(P
(t)
) = t the maximum that an be attained
for the instane dened. In both ases, however, the optima are reahed by sequenes of
exponentially many (inm) deals: thus, although Fat 1 guarantees onvergene of partiular
deal sequenes to optimal states it may be the ase, as illustrated in Corollary 1(a{b), that
the proess of onvergene takes onsiderable time.
2.3 O-ontrat Paths { Monotone Utility Funtions
We onlude our results onerning O -ontrats by presenting a lower bound on 
max
mono
, i.e.
the length of paths when the utility funtions are required to be monotone.
In priniple one ould attempt to onstrut appropriate monotone utility funtions that
would have the desired properties with respet to the path used in Theorem 3. It is, however,
far from lear whether suh a onstrution is possible. We do not attempt to resolve this
question here. Whether an exat translation ould be aomplished is, ultimately, a question
of purely ombinatorial interest: sine our aim is to demonstrate that exponential length
ontrat paths are needed with monotone utility funtions we are not, primarily, onerned
with obtaining an optimal bound.
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Theorem 4 With (P ;Q) and 	(P ;Q) be dened as in Theorem 3 and m  14

max
mono
(2;m;;	) 
8
>
>
<
>
>
:

77
128

2
m=2
  3 if m is even

77
128

2
(m 1)=2
  3 if m is odd
Proof. We desribe the details only for the ase of m being even: the result when m is
odd is obtained by a simple modiation whih we shall merely provide in outline.
Let m = 2s with s  7. For any path

s
= h
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
t
i
in H
s
(where 
i
desribes a subset of R
s
by an s-bit label), the path double(
s
) in H
2s
is
dened by
double(
s
) = h 
1

1
; 
2

2
; : : : ; 
i

i
; 
i+1

i+1
; : : : ; 
t

t
i
= h
1
; 
3
; : : : ; 
2i 1
; 
2i+1
; : : : ; 
2t 1
i
(The reason for suessive indies of  inreasing by 2 will beome lear subsequently)
Of ourse, double(
s
) does not desribe an O -ontrat path
6
: it is, however, not diÆult
to interpolate appropriate alloations, 
2i
, in order to onvert it to suh a path. Consider
the subsets 
2i
(with 1  i < t) dened as follows:

2i
=
(

i+1

i
if 
i
 
i+1

i

i+1
if 
i
 
i+1
If we now onsider the path, ext(
s
), within H
2s
given by
ext(
s
) = h
1
; 
2
; 
3
; : : : ; 
2(t 1)
; 
2t 1
i
then this satises,
a. If 
s
has property (SC) of Theorem 3 in H
s
then ext(
s
) has property (SC) in H
2s
.
b. If j is odd then j
j
j = s.
. If j is even then j
j
j = s + 1.
From (a) and the bounds proved in (Abbott & Kathalski, 1991) we dedue that ext(
s
)
an be hosen so that with P
(i)
denoting the alloation h
i
; 
i
i
d. ext(
s
) desribes an O -ontrat path from P
(1)
to P
(2t 1)
.
e. For eah pair hi ; j i with j  i + 2, the deal hP
(i)
;P
(j )
i is not an O -ontrat.
f. If 
s
is hosen as in the proof of Theorem 3 then the number of deals in ext(
s
) is
as given in the statement of the present theorem.
6. In terms of the lassiation desribed by Sandholm (1998), it ontains only swap deals (S -ontrats):
eah deal swaps exatly one item in 
2i 1
with an item in 
2i 1
in order to give 
2i+1
.
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We therefore x 
s
as the path from Theorem 3 so that in order to omplete the proof
we need to onstrut utility funtions hu
1
; u
2
i that are monotone and with whih ext(
s
)
denes the unique IR O -ontrat path realising the realloation hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i.
The hoie for u
2
is relatively simple. Given S  R
2s
,
u
2
(S ) =
8
>
<
>
:
0 if jS j  s   2
2t + 1 if jS j = s   1
2t + 2 if jS j  s
In this t is the number of alloations in 
s
. The behaviour of u
2
is learly monotone.
The onstrution for u
1
is rather more ompliated. Its main idea is to make use of
the fat that the size of eah set 
i
ourring in ext(
s
) is very tightly onstrained: j
i
j
is either s or s + 1 aording to whether i is odd or even. We rst demonstrate that eah
set of size s + 1 an have at most two strit subsets (of size s) ourring within ext(
s
):
thus, every S of size s + 1 has exatly 2 or 1 or 0 subsets of size s on ext(
s
). To see this
suppose the ontrary. Let , 
2i 1
, 
2j 1
, and 
2k 1
be suh that jj = s + 1 with

2i 1
  ; 
2j 1
  ; 
2k 1
 
Noting that 
2i 1
= 
i

i
and that 
s
has the property (SC) it must be the ase that (at
least) two of the s-bit labels from f
i
; 
j
; 
k
g dier in at least two positions. Without loss
of generality suppose this is true of 
i
and 
k
. As a result we dedue that the sets 
2i 1
and 
2k 1
have at most s 2 elements in ommon, i.e. j
2i 1
\
2k 1
j  s 2: 
2i 1
= 
i

i
and 
2k 1
= 
k

k
so in any position at whih 
i
diers from 
k
, 
i
diers from 
k
at
exatly the same position. In total j
2i 1
n
2k 1
j  2, i.e. there are (at least) two elements
of 
2i 1
that do not our in 
2k 1
; and in the same way j
2k 1
n 
2i 1
j  2, i.e. there are
(at least) two elements of 
2k 1
that do not our in 
2i 1
. The set , however, has only
s + 1 members and so annot have both 
2i 1
and 
2k 1
as subsets: this would require

2i 1
\ 
2k 1
[ 
2i 1
n 
2k 1
[ 
2k 1
n 
2i 1
 
but, as we have just seen,
j 
2i 1
\ 
2k 1
[ 
2i 1
n 
2k 1
[ 
2k 1
n 
2i 1
j  s + 2
One immediate onsequene of the argument just given is that for any set  of size s+1 there
are exatly two strit subsets of  ourring on ext(
s
) if and only if  = 
2i 1
[
2i+1
= 
2i
for some value of i with 1  i < t . We an now haraterise eah subset of R
2s
of size s+1
as falling into one of three ategories.
C1. Good sets, given by f :  = 
2i
g.
C2. Digressions, onsisting of
f  : 
2i 1
 ,  6= 
2i
and i < tg
C3. Inaessible sets, onsisting of
f  :  is neither Good nor a Digressiong
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Good sets are those desribing alloations to A
1
within the path dened by ext(
s
);
Digressions are the alloations that ould be reahed using an O -ontrat from a set of
size s on ext(
s
), i.e. 
2i 1
, but dier from the set that atually ours in ext(
s
), i.e.

2i
. Finally, Inaessible sets are those that do not our on ext(
s
) and annot be reahed
via an O -ontrat from any set on ext(
s
). We note that we view any set of size s + 1
that ould be reahed by an O -ontrat from 
2t 1
as being inaessible: in priniple it is
possible to extend the O -ontrat path beyond 
2t 1
, however, we hoose not ompliate
the onstrution in this way.
We now dene u
1
as
u
1
() =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
2i   1 if  = 
2i 1
2i + 1 if  = 
2i
2i if jj = s + 1 and  is a Digression from 
2i 1
0 if jj  s   1
0 if jj = s and  62 ext(
s
)
2t   1 if  is Inaessible or jj  s + 2
It remains only to prove for these hoies of hu
1
; u
2
i that theO -ontrat path hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(2t 1)
i
dened from ext(
s
) is the unique IR O -ontrat path realising the IR deal hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i
and that u
1
is monotone.
To show that hP
(1)
; : : : ;P
(2t 1)
i is IR we need to demonstrate
8 1  j < 2t   1 u
1
(
j
) + u
2
(
j
) < u
1
(
j+1
) + u
2
(
j+1
)
We have via the denition of hu
1
; u
2
i
u
1
(
2i 1
) + u
2
(
2i 1
) = 2(t + i) + 1
< u
1
(
2i
) + u
2
(
2i
)
= 2(t + i) + 2
< u
1
(
2i+1
) + u
2
(
2i+1
)
= 2(t + i) + 3
Thus, via Denition 4, it follows that ext(
s
) gives rise to an IR O -ontrat path.
To see that this path is the unique IR O -ontrat path implementing hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i,
onsider any position P
(j )
= h
j
; 
j
i and alloationQ other than P
(j+1)
or P
(j 1)
. It may be
assumed that the deal hP
(j )
;Qi is an O -ontrat. If j = 2i 1 then 
u
(P
(2i 1)
) = 2(t+i)+1
and j
j
j = s. Hene jQ
1
j 2 fs 1; s+1g. In the former ase, u
1
(Q
1
) = 0 and u
2
(Q
2
) = 2t+2
from whih 
u
(Q) = 2t + 2 and thus hP
(j )
;Qi is not IR. In the latter ase u
1
(Q
1
) = 2i
sine Q
1
is a Digression from 
2i 1
and u
2
(Q
2
) = 2t +1 giving 
u
(Q) = 2(t + i)+1. Again
hP
(j )
;Qi fails to be IR sine Q fails to give any inrease in the value of 
u
. We are left with
the ase j = 2i so that 
u
(P
(2i)
) = 2(t + i) + 2 and j
j
j = s +1. Sine hP
(j )
;Qi is assumed
to be an O -ontrat this gives jQ
1
j 2 fs; s + 2g. For the rst possibility Q
1
ould not be a
set on ext(
s
): 
2i 1
and 
2i+1
are both subsets of 
2i
and there an be at most two suh
subsets ourring on ext(
s
). It follows, therefore, that u
1
(Q
1
) = 0 giving 
u
(Q) = 2t + 2
so that hP
(j )
;Qi is not IR. In the seond possibility, u
1
(Q
1
) = 2t   1 but u
2
(Q
2
) = 0 as
jQ
2
j = s   2 so the deal would result in an overall loss. We dedue that for eah P
(j )
the
only IR O -ontrat onsistent with it is the deal hP
(j )
;P
(j+1)
i.
57
Dunne
The nal stage is to prove that the utility funtion u
1
is indeed a monotone funtion.
Suppose S and T are subsets of R
2s
with S  T . We need to show that u
1
(S )  u
1
(T ). We
may assume that jS j = s, that S ours as some set within ext(
s
), and that jT j = s + 1.
If jS j < s or jS j = s but does not our on ext(
s
) we have u
1
(S ) = 0 and the required
inequality holds; if jS j  s + 1 then in order for S  T to be possible we would need
jT j  s + 2, whih would give u
1
(T ) = 2t   1 and this is the maximum value that any
subset is assigned by u
1
. We are left with only jS j = s, jT j = s + 1 and S on ext(
s
) to
onsider. It has already been shown that there are at most two subsets of T that an our
on ext(
s
). Consider the dierent possibilities:
a. T = 
2i
so that exatly two subsets of T our in ext(
s
): 
2i 1
and 
2i+1
. Sine
u
1
(
2i
) = 2i + 1 and this is at least maxfu
1
(
2i 1
); u
1
(
2i+1
)g, should S be either of

2i 1
or 
2i+1
then u
1
(S )  u
1
(T ) as required.
b. T is a Digression from S = 
2i 1
, so that u
1
(T ) = 2i and u
1
(S ) = 2i   1 and, again,
u
1
(S )  u
1
(T ).
We dedue that u
1
is monotone ompleting our lower bound proof for 
max
mono
for even values
of m.
We onlude by observing that a similar onstrution an be used if m = 2s +1 is odd:
use the path ext(
s
) desribed above but modifying it so that one resoure (r
m
) is always
held by A
2
. Only minor modiations to the utility funtion denitions are needed. 2
Example 2 For s = 3, we an hoose 
3
= h000; 001; 101; 111; 110i so that t = 5. This
gives double(
3
) as
h000111; 001110; 101010; 111000; 110001i
with the O-ontrat path being dened from ext(
3
) whih is
h000111; 001111; 001110; 101110; 101010; 111010; 111000; 111001; 110001i
= h
1
; 
2
; 
3
; 
4
; 
5
; 
6
; 
7
; 
8
; 
9
i
Considering the 15 subsets of size s + 1 = 4, gives
Good = f001111; 101110; 111010; 111001g
Digression = f010111; 100111; 101011; 011110; 111100g
Inaessible = f011011; 011101; 101101; 110110; 110011; 110101g
Notie that both of the sets in f110011; 110101g are Inaessible: in priniple we ould
ontinue from 
9
= 110001 using either, however, in order to simplify the onstrution the
path is halted at 
9
.
Following the onstrution presented in Theorem 4, gives the following utility funtion
denitions with S  R = fr
1
; r
2
; r
3
; r
4
; r
5
; r
6
g.
u
2
(S ) =
8
>
<
>
:
0 if jS j  1
11 if jS j = 2
12 if jS j  3
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For u
1
we obtain
u
1
(S ) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
0 if jS j  2
0 if jS j = 3 and S 62 f000111; 001110; 101010; 111000; 110001g
1 if S = 000111 (
1
)
2 if S = 010111 (digression from 
1
)
2 if S = 100111 (digression from 
1
)
3 if S = 001111 (
2
)
3 if S = 001110 (
3
)
4 if S = 011110 (digression from 
3
)
5 if S = 101110 (
4
)
5 if S = 101010 (
5
)
6 if S = 101011 (digression from 
5
)
7 if S = 111010 (
6
)
7 if S = 111000 (
7
)
8 if S = 111100 (digression from 
7
)
9 if S = 111001 (
8
)
9 if S = 110001 (
9
)
9 if jS j  5 or S 2 f011011; 011101; 101101; 110110; 110011; 110101g
The monotone utility funtions, hu
1
; u
2
i, employed in proving Theorem 4 are dened so that
the path arising from ext(
s
) is IR: in the event of either agent suering a loss of utility the
gain made by the other is suÆient to provide a ompensatory payment. A natural question
that now arises is whether the bound obtained in Theorem 4 an be shown to apply when
the rationality onditions prelude any monetary payment, e.g. for ases where the onept
of rationality is one of those given in Denition 7. Our next result shows that if we set the
rationality ondition to enfore ooperatively rational or equitable deals then the bound of
Theorem 4 still holds.
Theorem 5 For eah of the ases below and m  14
a. (Æ) holds if and only if Æ is a ooperatively rational O-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is ooperatively rational.
b. (Æ) holds if and only if Æ is an equitable O-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is equitable.

max
mono
(2;m;;	) 
8
>
>
<
>
>
:

77
128

2
m=2
  3 if m is even

77
128

2
(m 1)=2
  3 if m is odd
Proof. We again illustrate the onstrutions only for the ase of m being even, noting the
modiation to deal with odd values of m outlined at the end of the proof of Theorem 4.
The path ext(
s
) is used for both ases.
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For (a), we require hu
1
; u
2
i to be dened as monotone funtions with whih ext(
s
) will
be the unique ooperatively rational O -ontrat path to realise the ooperatively rational
deal hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i where P
(j )
= h
j
; 
j
i. In this ase we set hu
1
; u
2
i to be,
hu
1
(); u
2
()i =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
hi ; ii if  = 
2i 1
hi + 1; ii if  = 
2i
hi ; i   1i if jj = s + 1 and  is a Digression from 
2i 1
h0; 2t   1i if jj  s   1
h0; 2t   1i if jj = s and  62 ext(
s
)
h2t   1; 0i if  is Inaessible or jj  s + 2
Sine,
hu
1
(
2i 1
); u
2
(
2i 1
)i = hi ; ii
hu
1
(
2i
); u
2
(
2i
)i = hi + 1; ii
hu
1
(
2i+1
); u
2
(
2i+1
)i = hi + 1; i + 1i
it is ertainly the ase that hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i and all deals on the O -ontrat path dened
by ext(
s
) are ooperatively rational. Furthermore if Q = h; i is any alloation other
than P
(j+1)
then the deal hP
(j )
;Qi will fail to be a ooperatively rational O -ontrat.
For suppose the ontrary letting hP
(j )
;Qi without loss of generality be an O -ontrat,
with Q 62 fP
(j 1)
;P
(j+1)
g { we an rule out the former ase sine we have already shown
suh an deal is not ooperatively rational. If j = 2i   1 so that hu
1
(
j
); u
2
(
j
)i = hi ; ii
then jj 2 fs   1; s + 1g: the former ase leads to a loss in utility for A
1
; the latter,
(sine  is a Digression from 
2i 1
) a loss in utility for A
2
. Similarly, if j = 2i so that
hu
1
(
j
); u
2
(
j
)i = hi+1; ii then jj 2 fs; s+2g: for the rst  62 ext(
s
) leading to a loss of
utility for A
1
; the seond results in a loss of utility for A
2
. It follows that the path dened by
ext(
s
) is the unique ooperatively rational O -ontrat path that realises hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i.
It remains only to show that these hoies for hu
1
; u
2
i dene monotone utility funtions.
Consider u
1
and suppose S and T are subsets of R
2s
with S  T . If jS j  s   1,
or S does not our on ext(
s
) then u
1
(S ) = 0. If jT j  s + 2 or is Inaessible then
u
1
(T ) = 2t   1 whih is the maximum value attainable by u
1
. So we may assume that
jS j = s, ours on ext(
s
), i.e. S = 
2i 1
; for some i , and that jT j = s + 1 and is either
a Good set or a Digression. From the denition of u
1
, u
1
(S ) = i : if T 2 f
2i
; 
2i 2
g then
u
1
(T )  i = u
1
(S ); if T is a Digression from 
2i 1
then u
1
(T ) = i = u
1
(S ). We dedue
that if S  T then u
1
(S )  u
1
(T ), i.e. the utility funtion is monotone.
Now onsider u
2
with S and T subsets of R
2s
having S  T . If jT j  s + 1 or
R
2s
n T does not our in ext(
s
) then u
2
(T ) = 2t   1 its maximal value. If jS j  s   2
or R
2s
n S is Inaessible then u
2
(S ) = 0. Thus we may assume that T = 
2i 1
giving
u
2
(T ) = i and jS j = s   1, so that R
2s
n S is either a Digression or one of the Good sets
f
2i
; 
2i 2
g. If R
2s
n S is a Digression then u
2
(S ) = i   1; if it is the Good set 
2i 2
then
u
2
(S ) = i   1 < u
2
(T ); if it is the Good set 
2i
then u
2
(S ) = i = u
2
(T ). It follows that
u
2
is monotone ompleting the proof of part (a).
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For (b) we use,
hu
1
(); u
2
()i =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
h2i   1; 2ii if  = 
2i 1
h2i + 1; 2ii if  = 
2i
h2i ; 2i   1i if jj = s + 1 and  is a Digression from 
2i 1
h0; 2t   1i if jj  s   1
h0; 2t   1i if jj = s and  62 ext(
s
)
h2t   1; 0i if  is Inaessible or jj  s + 2
These hoies give ext(
s
) as the unique equitable O -ontrat path to realise the equitable
deal hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i, sine
minfu
1
(
2i 1
); u
2
(
2i 1
)g = 2i   1
minfu
1
(
2i
); u
2
(
2i
)g = 2i
minfu
1
(
2i+1
); u
2
(
2i+1
)g = 2i + 1
eah deal hP
(j )
;P
(j+1)
i is equitable. If Q = h; i is any alloation other than P
(j+1)
then the deal hP
(j )
;Qi is not an equitable O -ontrat. Assume that hP
(j )
;Qi is an O -
ontrat, and that Q 62 fP
(j 1)
;P
(j+1)
g. If j = 2i   1, so that P
(j )
= h
2i 1
; 
2i 1
i
and minfu
1
(
2i 1
); u
2
(
2i 1
)g = 2i   1 then jj 2 fs   1; s + 1g. In the rst of these
minfu
1
(); u
2
()g = 0; in the seond minfu
1
(); u
2
()g = 2i   1 sine  must be a
Digression. This leaves only j = 2i with P
(j )
= h
2i
; 
2i
i and minfu
1
(
2i
); u
2
(
2i
)g = 2i .
For this, jj 2 fs; s + 2g: if jj = s then minfu
1
(); u
2
()g  2i   1 (with equality when
 = 
2i 1
); if jj = s + 2 then minfu
1
(); u
2
()g = 0. In total these establish that ext(
s
)
is the unique equitable O -ontrat path realising the equitable deal hP
(1)
;P
(2t 1)
i.
That the hoies for hu
1
; u
2
i desribe monotone utility funtions an be shown by a
similar argument to that of part (a). 2
Example 3 For s = 3 using the same O-ontrat path ext(
3
) as the previous example,
i.e.
h000111; 001111; 001110; 101110; 101010; 111010; 111000; 111001; 110001i
= h
1
; 
2
; 
3
; 
4
; 
5
; 
6
; 
7
; 
8
; 
9
i
For hu
1
; u
2
i in (a) we obtain
hu
1
(S); u
2
(R n S)i =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
h0; 9i if jS j  2
h0; 9i if jS j = 3 and S 62 f000111; 001110; 101010; 111000; 110001g
h1; 1i if S = 000111 (
1
)
h1; 0i if S = 010111 digression from 
1
h1; 0i if S = 100111 digression from 
1
h2; 1i if S = 001111 (
2
)
h2; 2i if S = 001110 (
3
)
h2; 1i if S = 011110 digression from 
3
h3; 2i if S = 101110 (
4
)
h3; 3i if S = 101010 (
5
)
h3; 2i if S = 101011 digression from 
5
h4; 3i if S = 111010 (
6
)
h4; 4i if S = 111000 (
7
)
h4; 3i if S = 111100 digression from 
7
h5; 4i if S = 111001 (
8
)
h5; 5i if S = 110001 (
9
)
h9; 0i if jS j  5 or S 2 f011011; 011101; 101101; 110110; 110011; 110101g
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Similarly, in (b)
hu
1
(S); u
2
(R n S)i =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
h0; 9i if jS j  2
h0; 9i if jS j = 3 and S 62 f000111; 001110; 101010; 111000; 110001g
h1; 2i if S = 000111 (
1
)
h2; 1i if S = 010111 digression from 
1
h2; 1i if S = 100111 digression from 
1
h3; 2i if S = 001111 (
2
)
h3; 4i if S = 001110 (
3
)
h4; 3i if S = 011110 digression from 
3
h5; 4i if S = 101110 (
4
)
h5; 6i if S = 101010 (
5
)
h6; 5i if S = 101011 digression from 
5
h7; 6i if S = 111010 (
6
)
h7; 8i if S = 111000 (
7
)
h8; 7i if S = 111100 digression from 
7
h9; 8i if S = 111001 (
8
)
h9; 10i if S = 110001 (
9
)
h9; 0i if jS j  5 or S 2 f011011; 011101; 101101; 110110; 110011; 110101g
That we an demonstrate similar extremal behaviours for ontrat path length with
rationality onstraints in both money-based (individual rationality) and money-free (oop-
erative rationality, equitable) settings irrespetive of whether monotoniity properties are
assumed, has some interesting parallels with other ontexts in whih monotoniity is rel-
evant. In partiular we an observe that in ommon with the omplexity results already
noted from (Dunne et al., 2003) { deiding if an alloation is Pareto optimal, if an alloa-
tion maximises 
u
, or if an IR O -ontrat path exists { requiring utility funtions to be
monotone does not result in a setting whih is omputationally more tratable.
3. M (k)-ontrat paths
We now turn to similar issues with respet to M (k)-ontrats, realling that in one respet
these oer a form of deal that does not t into the lassiation of Sandholm (1998). This
lassiation denes four forms of ontrat type: O -ontrats, as onsidered in the previous
setion; S -ontrats, that involve exatly 2 agents swapping single resoures; C -ontrats,
in whih one agent tranfers at least two of its resoures to another; andM -ontrats in whih
three or more agents realloate their resoure holding amongst themselves. Our denition
of M (k)-ontrats permits two agents to exhange resoures (thus are not M -ontrats in
Sandholm's (1998) sheme) and the deals permitted are not restrited to O , S , and C -
ontrats. In one regard, however, M (k)-ontrats are not as general as M -ontrats sine
a preset bound (k) is speied for the number of agents involved.
Our main result on M (k)-ontrat paths is the following development of Theorem 3.
Theorem 6 Let 
k
(P ;Q) be the prediate whih holds whenever hP ;Qi is an IR M (k)-
ontrat. For all k  3, n  k and m 

k
2

, there is a resoure alloation setting
hA;R;Ui and an IR deal Æ = hP ;Qi for whih,
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k
) = 1 (a)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 1
)  2
b2m=k(k 1)
  1 (b)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 2
) is undened ()
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Before presenting the proof, we omment about the formulation of the theorem statement
and give an overview of the proof struture.
We rst note that the lower bounds (where dened) have been phrased in terms of
the funtion L
opt
as opposed to 
max
used in the various results on O -ontrat paths in
Setion 2.2. It is, of ourse, the ase that the bound laimed for L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 1
)
will also be a lower bound on 
max
(n;m;
k 1
;	) when n  k and 	(P ;Q) holds whenever
the deal hP ;Qi is IR. The statement of Theorem 6, however, laims rather more than this,
namely that a spei resoure alloation setting hA;R;Ui an be dened for eah n  k
and eah m, together with an IR deal hP ;Qi in suh a way that: hP ;Qi an be ahieved by
a single M (k)-ontrat and annot be realised by an IR M (k   2)-ontrat path. Realling
that L
opt
is a partial funtion, the latter property is equivalent to the laim made in part
() for the deal hP ;Qi of the theorem statement. Furthermore, this same deal although
ahievable by an IR M (k   1)-ontrat path an be so realised only by one whose length is
as given in part (b) of the theorem statement.
Regarding the proof itself, there are a number of notational omplexities whih we have
attempted to ameliorate by making some simplifying assumptions onerning the relation-
ship between m { the size of the resoure set R { and k { the number of agents whih are
needed to realise hP ;Qi in a single IR deal. In partiular, we shall assume that m is an
exat multiple of

k
2

. We observe that by employing a similar devie to that used in
the proof of Theorem 4 we an deal with ases for whih m does not have this property: if
m = s

k
2

+ q for integer values s  1 and 1  q <

k
2

, we simply employ exatly the
same onstrution using m q resoures with the \missing" q resoures from R
m
being allo-
ated to A
1
and never being realloated within the M (k   1)-ontrat path. This approah
aounts for the rounding operation (b: : :) in the exponent term of the lower bound. We
shall also assume that the number of agents in A is exatly k . Within the proof we use a
running example for whih k = 4 and m = 18 = 3 6 to illustrate spei features.
We rst give an outline of its struture.
Given hA;R;Ui a resoure alloation setting involving k agents and m resoures, our
aim is to dene an IR M (k   1)-ontrat path
 = hP
(1)
;P
(2)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i
that realises the IR M (k) deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i. We will use d to index partiular alloations
within , so that 1  d  t .
In order to simplify the presentation we employ a setting in whih the k agents are
A = fA
0
;A
1
; : : : ;A
k 1
g. Realling that m = s

k
2

, the resoure set R
m
is formed by
the union of

k
2

pairwise disjoint sets of size s. Given distint values i and j with
0  i < j  k 1, we use R
i ;j
to denote one of these subsets with fr
fi ;jg
1
; r
fi ;jg
2
; : : : ; r
fi ;jg
s
g
the s resoures that form R
fi ;jg
.
There are two main ideas underpinning the struture of eah M (k   1)-ontrat in .
Firstly, in the initial and subsequent alloations, the resoure set R
fi ;jg
is partitioned
between A
i
and A
j
and any realloation of resoures between A
i
and A
j
that takes plae
within the deal hP
(d)
;P
(d+1)
i will involve only resoures in this set. Thus, for every al-
loation P
(d)
and eah pair fi ; jg, if h 62 fi ; jg then P
(d)
h
\ R
fi ;jg
= ;. Furthermore, for
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Æ = hP
(d)
;P
(d+1)
i should both A
i
and A
j
be involved, i.e. fA
i
;A
j
g  A
Æ
, then this real-
loation of R
fi ;jg
between A
i
and A
j
will be an O -ontrat. That is, either exatly one
element of R
fi ;jg
will be moved from P
(d)
i
to beome a member of the alloation P
(d+1)
j
or
exatly one element of R
fi ;jg
will be moved from P
(d)
j
to beome a member of the alloation
P
(d+1)
i
. In total, every M (k   1)-ontrat Æ in  onsists of a simultaneous implementation
of

k   1
2

O -ontrats: a single O -ontrat for eah of the distint pairs fA
i
;A
j
g of agents
from the k   1 agents in A
Æ
.
The seond key idea is to exploit one well-known property of the s-dimensional hyper-
ube network: for every s  2, H
s
ontains a Hamiltonian yle, i.e. a simple direted yle
formed using only the edges of H
s
and ontaining all 2
s
verties.
7
Now, suppose
S
(v)
= v
(0)
; v
(1)
; : : : ; v
(i)
; : : : ; v
(2
s
 1)
; v
(0)
is a Hamiltonian yle in the hyperube H
s
and
S
(w)
= w
(0)
;w
(1)
; : : : ;w
(i)
; : : : ;w
(2
s
 1)
;w
(0)
the Hamiltonian yle in whih w
(i)
is obtained by omplementing eah bit in v
(i)
. As we
have desribed in the overview of Setion 2.1 we an interpret the s-bit label v = v
1
v
2
: : : v
s
as desribing a partiular subset ofR
fi ;jg
, i.e. that subset in whih r
fi ;jg
k
ours if and only if
v
k
= 1. Similarly from any subset of R
fi ;jg
we may dene a unique s-bit word. Now suppose
that P
(d)
i
is the alloation held by A
i
in the alloation P
(d)
of . The deal Æ = hP
(d)
;P
(d+1)
i
will aet P
(d)
i
\ R
fi ;jg
in the following way: if i 62 A
Æ
or j 62 A
Æ
then P
(d+1)
i
\ R
fi ;jg
=
P
(d)
i
\ R
fi ;jg
and P
(d+1)
j
\ R
fi ;jg
= P
(d)
j
\ R
fi ;jg
. Otherwise we have fi ; jg  A
Æ
and
the (omplementary) holdings P
(d)
i
\R
fi ;jg
and P
(d)
j
\R
fi ;jg
dene (omplementary) s-bit
labels of verties in H
s
: if these orrespond to plaes hv
(h)
;w
(h)
i in the Hamiltonian yles,
then in P
(d+1)
i
and P
(d+1)
j
the s-bit labels dened from P
(d+1)
i
\R
fi ;jg
and P
(d+1)
j
\R
fi ;jg
produe the s-bit labels v
(h+1)
and w
(h+1)
, i.e. the verties that sueed v
(h)
and w
(h)
in
the Hamiltonian yles. In total, for eah j , A
i
initially holds either the subset of R
fi ;jg
that
maps to v
(0)
or that maps to w
(0)
and, at the onlusion of the M (k   1)-path, holds the
subset that maps to v
(2
s
 1)
(or w
(2
s
 1)
). The nal detail is that the progression through the
Hamiltonian yles is onduted over a series of rounds eah round omprising k M (k   1)-
deals.
We have noted that eahM (k 1)-ontrat, hP
(d)
;P
(d+1)
i that ours in this path  an
be interpreted as a set of

k   1
2

distintO -ontrats. An important property of the utility
funtions employed is that unless p  k   1 there will be no individually rational M (p)-
ontrat path that realises the deal hP
(d)
;P
(d+1)
i, i.e. the

k   1
2

O -ontrat deals must
our simultaneously in order for the progression from P
(d)
to P
(d+1)
to be IR. Although
the required deal ould be realised by a sequene of O -ontrats (or, more generally, any
suitable M (k   2)-ontrat path), suh realisations will not desribe an IR ontrat path.
7. This an be shown by an easy indutive argument. For s = 2, the sequene h00; 01; 11; 10; 00i denes a
Hamiltonian yle in H
2
. Indutively assume that h
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
p
; 
1
i (with p = 2
s
) is suh a yle in
H
s
then h0
1
; 1
1
; 1
p
; 1
p 1
; : : : ; 1
2
; 0
2
: : : ; 0
p
; 0
1
i denes a Hamiltonian yle in H
s+1
.
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The onstrution of utility funtions to guarantee suh behaviour provides the prinipal
omponent in showing that the IR deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i annot be realised with an IR M (k 2)-
ontrat path: if Q is any alloation for whih hP
(1)
;Qi is an M (k   2)-ontrat then
hP
(1)
;Qi is not IR.
We now proeed with the proof of Theorem 6.
Proof. (of Theorem 6) Fix A = fA
0
;A
1
; : : : ;A
k 1
g. R onsists of

k
2

pairwise disjoint
sets of s resoures
R
fi ;jg
= fr
fi ;jg
1
; r
fi ;jg
2
; : : : ; r
fi ;jg
s
g
For k = 4 and s = 3 these yield A = fA
0
;A
1
;A
2
;A
3
g and
R
f0;1g
= fr
f0;1g
1
; r
f0;1g
2
; r
f0;1g
3
g
R
f0;2g
= fr
f0;2g
1
; r
f0;2g
2
; r
f0;2g
3
g
R
f0;3g
= fr
f0;3g
1
; r
f0;3g
2
; r
f0;3g
3
g
R
f1;2g
= fr
f1;2g
1
; r
f1;2g
2
; r
f1;2g
3
g
R
f1;3g
= fr
f1;3g
1
; r
f1;3g
2
; r
f1;3g
3
g
R
f2;3g
= fr
f2;3g
1
; r
f2;3g
2
; r
f2;3g
3
g
We use two ordering strutures in dening the M (k   1)-ontrat path.
a.
S
(v)
= v
(0)
; v
(1)
; : : : ; v
(i)
; : : : ; v
(2
s
 1)
; v
(0)
a Hamiltonian yle in H
s
, where without loss of generality, v
(0)
= 111 : : : 11.
b.
S
(w)
= w
(0)
;w
(1)
; : : : ;w
(i)
; : : : ;w
(2
s
 1)
;w
(0)
the omplementary Hamiltonian yle to this, so that w
(0)
= 000 : : : 00.
Thus for k = 4 and s = 3 we obtain
a. S
(v)
= h111; 110; 010; 011; 001; 000; 100; 101i
b. S
(w)
= h000; 001; 101; 100; 110; 111; 011; 010i
We an now desribe the M (k   1)-ontrat path.
 = hP
(1)
;P
(2)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i
Initial Alloation: P
(1)
.
Dene the k  k Boolean matrix, B = [b
i ;j
℄ (with 0  i ; j  k   1) by
b
i ;j
=
8
>
<
>
:
? if i = j
:b
j ;i
if i > j
:b
i ;j 1
if i < j
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We then have for eah 1  i  k ,
P
(1)
i
=
i 1
[
j=0
f R
fj ;ig
: b
i ;j
= >g [
k 1
[
j=i+1
f R
fi ;jg
: b
i ;j
= >g
Thus, in our example,
B =
2
6
6
6
4
? > ? >
? ? > ?
> ? ? >
? > ? ?
3
7
7
7
5
Yielding the starting alloation
P
(1)
0
= R
f0;1g
[R
f0;3g
= h111; 000; 111i  R
f0;1g
[R
f0;2g
[R
f0;3g
P
(1)
1
= R
f1;2g
= h000; 111; 000i  R
f0;1g
[R
f1;2g
[R
f1;3g
P
(1)
2
= R
f0;2g
[R
f2;3g
= h111; 000; 111i  R
f0;2g
[R
f1;2g
[R
f2;3g
P
(1)
3
= R
f1;3g
= h000; 111; 000i  R
f0;3g
[R
f1;3g
[R
f2;3g
The third olumn in P
(1)
i
indiating the 3-bit labels haraterising eah of the subsets of
R
fi ;jg
for the three values that j an assume.
Rounds: The initial alloation is hanged over a series of rounds
Q
1
;Q
2
; : : : ;Q
z
eah of whih involves exatly k distint M (k   1)-ontrats. We use Q
x ;p
to indiate the
alloation resulting after stage p in round x where 0  p  k   1. We note the following:
a. The initial alloation, P
(1)
will be denoted by Q
0;k 1
.
b. Q
x ;0
is obtained using a single M (k   1)-ontrat from Q
x 1;k 1
(when x  1).
. Q
x ;p
is obtained using a single M (k   1)-ontrat from Q
x ;p 1
(when 0 < p  k   1).
Our nal item of notation is that of the ube position of i with respet to j in an alloation
P , denoted (i ; j ;P). Letting u be the s-bit string desribing P
i
\R
fi ;jg
in some alloation
P , (i ; j ;P) is the index of u in the Hamiltonian yle S
(v)
(when R
fi ;jg
 P
(1)
i
) or the
Hamiltonian yle S
(w)
(when R
fi ;jg
 P
(1)
j
). When P = Q
x ;p
for some alloation in the
sequene under onstrution we employ the notation (i ; j ; x ; p), noting that one invariant
of our path will be (i ; j ; x ; p) = (j ; i ; x ; p), a property that ertainly holds true of P
(1)
=
Q
0;k 1
sine (i ; j ; 0; k   1) = (j ; i ; 0; k   1) = 0.
The sequene of alloations in  is built as follows. Sine Q
1;0
is the immediate suessor
of the initial alloation Q
0;k 1
, it suÆes to desribe how Q
x ;p
is formed from Q
x ;p 1
(when
p > 0) and Q
x+1;0
from Q
x ;k 1
. Let Q
y;q
be the alloation to be formed from Q
x ;p
. The
deal Æ = hQ
x ;p
;Q
y;q
i will be an M (k   1) ontrat in whih A
Æ
= A n fA
q
g. For eah pair
fi ; jg  A
Æ
we have (i ; j ; x ; p) = (j ; i ; x ; p) in the alloation Q
x ;p
. In moving to Q
y;q
exatly one element of R
fi ;jg
is realloated between A
i
and A
j
in suh a way that in Q
y;q
,
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(i ; j ; y ; q) = (i ; j ; x ; p)+1, sine A
i
and A
j
are traing omplementary Hamiltonian yles
with respet to R
fi ;jg
this ensures that (j ; i ; y ; q) = (j ; i ; x ; p) + 1, thereby maintaining
the invariant property.
Noting that for eah distint pair hi ; j i, we either have R
fi ;jg
alloated to A
i
in P
(1)
or R
fi ;jg
alloated to A
j
in P
(1)
, the desription just outlined indiates that the alloation
P
(d)
= Q
x ;p
is ompletely speied as follows.
The ube position, (i ; j ; x ; p), satises,
(i ; j ; x ; p) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
0 if x = 0 and p = k   1
1 + (i ; j ; x   1; k   1) if x  1, p = 0, and p 62 fi ; jg
(i ; j ; x   1; k   1) if x  1, p = 0, and p 2 fi ; jg
1 + (i ; j ; x ; p   1) if 1  p  k   1, and p 62 fi ; jg
(i ; j ; x ; p   1) if 1  p  k   1, and p 2 fi ; jg
For eah i , the subset of R
fi ;jg
that is held by A
i
in the alloation Q
x ;p
is,
v
((i ;j ;x ;p))
if R
fi ;jg
 P
(1)
i
w
((i ;j ;x ;p))
if R
fi ;jg
 P
(1)
j
(where we reall that s-bit labels in the hyperubeH
s
are identied with subsets
of R
fi ;jg
.)
The tables below illustrates this proess for our example.
A
0
A
1
A
2
A
3
i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j A
hP
(d 1)
;P
(d)
i
d x p 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 3 2 0 2 1 2 3 3 0 3 1 3 2
1 0 3 111 000 111 000 111 000 111 000 111 000 111 000 {
2 1 0 111 000 111 000 110 001 111 001 110 000 110 001 fA
1
;A
2
;A
3
g
3 1 1 111 001 110 000 110 001 110 001 010 001 110 101 fA
0
;A
2
;A
3
g
4 1 2 110 001 010 001 110 101 110 001 010 101 010 101 fA
0
;A
1
;A
3
g
5 1 3 010 101 010 101 010 101 010 101 010 101 010 101 fA
0
;A
1
;A
2
g
6 2 0 010 101 011 101 011 100 010 100 011 101 011 100 fA
1
;A
2
;A
3
g
7 2 1 010 100 001 101 011 100 011 100 001 100 011 110 fA
0
;A
2
;A
3
g
8 2 2 011 100 001 100 011 110 011 100 001 110 001 110 fA
0
;A
1
;A
3
g
9 2 3 001 110 001 110 001 110 001 110 001 110 001 110 fA
0
;A
1
;A
2
g
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Subsets of R
fi;jg
held by A
i
in Q
x ;p
(k = 4, s = 3)
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A
0
A
1
A
2
A
3
i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j A
hP
(d 1)
;P
(d)
i
d x p 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 3 2 0 2 1 2 3 3 0 3 1 3 2
1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 {
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 fA
1
;A
2
;A
3
g
3 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 fA
0
;A
2
;A
3
g
4 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 fA
0
;A
1
;A
3
g
5 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 fA
0
;A
1
;A
2
g
6 2 0 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 fA
1
;A
2
;A
3
g
7 2 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 fA
0
;A
2
;A
3
g
8 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 fA
0
;A
1
;A
3
g
9 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 fA
0
;A
1
;A
2
g
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Cube Positions (i ; j ; x ; p) (k = 4, s = 3)
It is ertainly the ase that this proess of applying suessive rounds of k deals ould be
ontinued, however, we wish to do this only so long as it is not possible to go from some
alloation P
(d)
in the sequene to another P
(d+r)
for some r  2 via an M (k   1)-ontrat.
Now if Q
x ;p
and Q
y;q
are distint alloations generated by the proess above then the
deal Æ = hQ
x ;p
;Q
y;q
i is an M (k   1)-ontrat if and only if for some A
i
, Q
x ;p
i
= Q
y;q
i
. It
follows that if hP
(d)
;P
(d+r)
i is an M (k   1)-ontrat for some r > 1, then for some i and
all j 6= i , P
(d+r)
i
\R
fi ;jg
= P
(d)
i
\R
fi ;jg
.
To determine the minimum value of r > 1 with whih P
(d+r)
i
= P
(d)
i
, we observe that
without loss of generality we need onsider only the ase d = i = 0, i.e. we determine
the minimum number of deals before P
(1)
0
reappears. First note that in eah round, Q
x
, if
(0; j ; x   1; k   1) = p then (0; j ; x ; k   1) = p + k   2, i.e. eah round advanes the ube
position k   2 plaes: (0; j ; x   1; k   1) = (0; j ; x ; 0) and (0; j ; x ; j ) = (0; j ; x ; j   1).
We an also observe that P
(1)
0
= Q
0;k 1
0
6= Q
x ;p
0
for any p with 0 < p < k   1, sine
(0; 1; x ; p) = (0; 2; x ; p) = : : : = (0; k   1; x ; p)
only in the ases p = 0 and p = k   1. It follows that our value r > 1 must be of the form
qk where q must be suh that q(k   2) is an exat multiple of 2
s
. From this observation we
see that,
minf r > 1 : P
(1)
0
= P
(1+r)
0
g = minf qk : q(k   2) is a multiple of 2
s
g
Now, if k is odd then q = 2
s
is the minimal suh value, so that r = k2
s
. If k is even then
it may be uniquely written in the form z2
l
+ 2 where z is odd so giving q as 1 (if l  s) or
2
s l
(if l  s), so that these give r = k and r = z2
s
+ 2
s l+1
, e.g. for k = 4 and s = 3, we
get k = 1  2
1
+ 2 so that r = 2
3
+ 2
3 1+1
= 16 and in our example P
(1)
0
= P
(17)
0
may be
easily veried. In total,
r 
8
>
<
>
:
k2
s
if k is odd
k if k = z2
l
+ 2, z is odd, and l  s
2
s
if k = z2
l
+ 2, z is odd and l  s
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All of whih immediately give r  2
s
(in the seond ase k  2
s
, so the inequality holds
trivially), and thus we an ontinue the hain of M (k   1) ontrats for at least 2
s
moves.
Realling that m = s

k
2

, this gives the length of the M (k   1)-ontrat path
 = hP
(1)
;P
(2)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i
written in terms of m and k as at least
8
2
m=

k
2

  1 = 2
2m
k(k 1)
  1
It remains to dene appropriate utility funtions U = hu
0
; : : : ; u
k 1
i in order to ensure that
 is the unique IR M (k   1)-ontrat path realising the IR M (k)-deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i. In
dening U it will be onvenient to denote  as the path
 = hQ
0;k 1
;Q
1;0
;Q
1;1
; : : : ;Q
1;k 1
; : : : ;Q
x ;p
; : : : ;Q
r ;k 1
i
and, sine rk  2
s
, we may without loss of generality, fous on the rst 2
s
alloations in
this ontrat path.
Realling that (i ; j ; x ; p) is the index of the s-bit label u orresponding to Q
x ;p
i
\R
fi ;jg
in the relevant Hamiltonian yle { i.e. S
(v)
if R
fi ;jg
 Q
0;k
i
, S
(w)
if R
fi ;jg
 Q
0;k 1
j
{ we
note the following properties of the sequene of alloations dened by  that hold for eah
distint i and j .
P1. 8 x ; p (i ; j ; x ; p) = (j ; i ; x ; p)
P2. If Q
y;q
is the immediate suessor of Q
x ;p
in  then (i ; j ; y ; q)  (i ; j ; x ; p) + 1
with equality if and only if q 62 fi ; jg.
P3. 8 i
0
; j
0
with 0  i
0
; j
0
 k   1, (i ; j ; x ; k   1) = (i
0
; j
0
; x ; k   1).
The rst two properties have already been established in our desription of . The third
follows from the observation that within eah round Q
x
, eah ube position is advaned by
exatly k   2 in progressing from Q
x 1;0
to Q
x ;k 1
.
The utility funtion u
i
is now given, for S  R
m
, by
u
i
(S ) =
(
P
j 6=i
(i ; j ; x ; p) if S = Q
x ;p
i
for some 0  x  r , 0  p  k   1
 2
km
otherwise
We laim that, with these hoies,
 = hQ
0;k 1
;Q
1;0
;Q
1;1
; : : : ;Q
1;k 1
; : : : ;Q
x ;p
; : : : ;Q
r ;k 1
i
is the unique IR M (k   1)-ontrat path realising the IR M (k)-deal hQ
0;k 1
;Q
r ;k 1
i. Cer-
tainly,  is an IR M (k   1)-ontrat path: eah deal Æ = hQ
x ;p
;Q
y;q
i on this path has
jA
Æ
j = k   1 and sine for eah agent A
i
in A
Æ
= An fA
q
g the utility of Q
y;q
i
has inreased
8. We omit the rounding operation b: : : in the exponent, whih is signiant only if m is not an exat
multiple of

k
2

, in whih event the devie desribed in our overview of the proof is applied.
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by exatly k   2, i.e. eah ube position of i with respet to j whenever q 62 fi ; jg has
inreased, it follows that 
u
(Q
y;q
) > 
u
(Q
x ;p
) and hene hQ
x ;p
;Q
y;q
i is IR.
We now show that  is the unique IR M (k   1)-ontrat path ontinuation of Q
0;k 1
Suppose Æ = hQ
x ;p
;Pi is a deal that deviates from the ontrat path  (having followed
it through to the alloation Q
x ;p
). Certainly both of the following must hold of P : for
eah i , P
i
 [
j 6=i
R
fi ;jg
; and there is a k -tuple of pairs h(x
0
; p
0
); : : : ; (x
k 1
; p
k 1
)i with
whih P
i
= Q
x
i
;p
i
i
, for if either fail to be the ase for some i , then u
i
(P
i
) =  2
km
with the
onsequent eet that 
u
(P) < 0 and thene not IR. Now, if Q
y;q
is the alloation that
would sueed Q
x ;p
in  then P 6= Q
y;q
, and thus for at least one agent, Q
x
i
;p
i
i
6= Q
y;q
i
.
It annot be the ase that Q
x
i
;p
i
i
orresponds to an alloation ourring stritly later than
Q
y;q
i
in  sine suh alloations ould not be realised by an M (k 1)-ontrat. In addition,
sine P
i
= Q
x
i
;p
i
i
it must be the ase that jA
Æ
j = k   1 sine exatly k   1 ube positions in
the holding of A
i
must hange. It follows that there are only two possibilities for (y
i
; p
i
):
P
i
reverts to the alloation immediately preeding Q
x ;p
i
or advanes to the holding Q
y;q
i
.
It now suÆes to observe that a deal in whih some agents satisfy the rst of these while
the remainder proeed in aordane with the seond either does not give rise to a valid
alloation or annot be realised by anM (k 1)-ontrat. On the other hand if P orresponds
to the alloation preeding Q
x ;p
then Æ is not IR. We dedue, therefore, that the only IR
M (k   1) deal that is onsistent with Q
x ;p
is that presribed by Q
y;q
.
This ompletes the analysis needed for the proof of part (b) of the theorem. It is
lear that sine the system ontains only k agents, any deal hP ;Qi an be eeted with
a single M (k)-ontrat, thereby establishing part (a). For part () { that the IR deal
hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i annot be realised using an individually rational M (k   2)-ontrat path, it
suÆes to observe that sine the lass of IR M (k   2)-ontrats are a subset of the lass
of IR M (k   1)-ontrats, were it the ase that an IR M (k   2)-ontrat path existed to
implement hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i, this would imply that  was not the unique IR M (k   1)-ontrat
path. We have, however, proved that  is unique, and part () of the theorem follows. 2
We obtain a similar development of Corollary 1 in
Corollary 3 For all k  3, n  k, m 

k
2

and eah of the ases below,
a. 
k
(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is a ooperatively rational M (k)-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is ooperatively rational.
b. 
k
(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is Æ is an equitable M (k)-ontrat.
	(Æ) holds if and only if Æ is is equitable.
there is a resoure alloation setting hA;R;Ui and a 	-deal Æ = hP ;Qi for whih
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k
) = 1 (a)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 1
)  2
b2m=k(k 1)
  1 (b)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 2
) is undened ()
Proof. As with the proof of Corollary 1 in relation to Theorem 3, in eah ase we employ
the ontrat path from the proof of Theorem 6, varying the denition of U = hu
1
; u
2
; : : : ; u
k
i
in order to establish eah result. Thus let

m
= hP
(1)
;P
(2)
; : : : ;P
(r)
; : : : ;P
(t)
i
= hQ
0;k 1
;Q
1;0
; : : : ;Q
x ;p
; : : : ;Q
z ;r
i
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be the M (k   1)-ontrat path realising the M (k)-deal hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i desribed in the proof
of Theorem 6, this path having length t  2
b2m=k(k   1)
  1.
a. The utility funtions U = hu
0
; : : : ; u
k 1
i of Theorem 6 ensure that hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i is
ooperatively rational and that 
m
is a ooperatively rational M (k   1)-ontrat
path realising hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i: the utility held by A
i
never dereases in value and there is
at least one agent (in fat exatly k  1) whose utility inreases in value. Furthermore

m
is the unique ooperatively rational M (k   1)-ontrat path realising hP
(1)
;P
(t)
i
sine, by the same argument used in Theorem 6, any deviation will result in some
agent suering a loss of utility.
b. Set the utility funtions U = hu
0
; : : : ; u
k 1
i as,
u
i
(S ) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
 1 if S 6= Q
x ;p
i
for any Q
x ;p
2 
m
xk
2
+ k   i if S = Q
x ;k 1
i
(x   1)k
2
+ k + p if S = Q
x ;p
0
, p < k   1 and i = 0
(x   1)k
2
+ k   i + p + 1 if S = Q
x ;p
i
, p < i   1 and i 6= 0.
xk
2
+ 1 if S = Q
x ;i 1
i
= Q
x ;i
i
and i 6= 0.
xk
2
+ 1 + p   i if S = Q
x ;p
i
, p > i and i 6= 0
To see that these hoies admit 
m
as an equitable M (k   1)-ontrat path realising
the equitable deal hQ
0;k 1
;Q
z ;r
i, we rst note that
min
0ik 1
fu
i
(Q
z ;r
i
)g > 1 = min
0ik 1
fu
i
(Q
0;k 1
i
)g
thus, hQ
0;k 1
;Q
z ;r
i is indeed equitable. Consider any deal Æ = hQ
x ;p
;Q
y;q
i ourring
within 
m
. It suÆes to show that
min
0ik 1
fu
i
(Q
x ;p
i
)g 6= u
q
(Q
x ;p
q
)
sine A
q
62 A
Æ
, and for all other agents u
i
(Q
y;q
i
) > u
i
(Q
x ;p
i
). We have two possibilities:
q = 0 (in whih ase p = k   1 and y = x + 1); q > 0 (in whih ase p = q   1).
Consider the rst of these: u
0
(Q
x ;k 1
0
) = xk
2
+ k , however,
minfu
i
(Q
x ;k 1
i
)g = xk
2
+ 1 = u
k 1
(Q
x ;k 1
k 1
)
and hene every deal hQ
x ;k 1
;Q
x+1;0
i forming part of 
m
is equitable.
In the remaining ase, u
q
(Q
x ;q 1
q
) = xk
2
+ 1 and
minfu
i
(Q
x ;q 1
i
)g  u
0
(Q
x ;q 1
0
)
= (x   1)k
2
+ k + q   1
< xk
2
  (k
2
  2k + 1)
= xk
2
  (k   1)
2
< xk
2
+ 1
= u
q
(Q
x ;q 1
q
)
and thus the remaining deals hQ
x ;q 1
;Q
x ;q
i within 
m
are equitable. By a similar
argument to that employed in Theorem 6 it follows that 
m
is the unique equitable
M (k   1)-ontrat path realising hQ
0;k 1
;Q
z ;r
i.
2
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Monotone Utility Funtions and M (k)-ontrat paths
The devie used to develop Theorem 3 to obtain the path of Theorem 4 an be applied
to the rather more intriate onstrution of Theorem 6, thereby allowing exponential lower
bounds on 
max
mono
(n;m;
k
;	) to be derived. We will merely outline the approah rather than
present a detailed tehnial exposition. We reall that it beame relatively straightforward
to dene suitable monotone utility funtions one it was ensured that the subset sizes of
interest { i.e. those for alloations arising in the O -ontrat path { were fored to fall into
a quite restrited range. The main diÆulty that arises in applying similar methods to the
path  of Theorem 6 is the following: in the proof of Theorem 4 we onsider two agents
so that onverting 
s
from a setting with s resoures in Theorem 3 to ext(
s
) with 2s
resoures in Theorem 4 is ahieved by ombining \omplementary" alloations, i.e.   R
s
with   T
s
. We an exploit two fats, however, to develop a path multi() for whih
monotone utility funtions ould be dened: the resoure set R
m
in Theorem 6 onsists of

k
2

disjoint sets of size s; and any deal Æ on the path  involves a realloation of R
fi ;jg
between A
i
and A
j
when fi ; jg  A
Æ
. Thus letting T
m
be formed by

k
2

disjoint sets,
T
fi ;jg
eah of size s, suppose that P
(d)
i
is desribed by

(d)
i ;0

(d)
i ;1
   
(d)
i ;i 1

(d)
i ;i+1
   
(d)
i ;k 1
with 
(d)
i ;j
the s-bit label orresponding to the subset of R
fi ;jg
that is held by A
i
in P
(d)
.
Consider the sequene of alloations,
multi() = hC
(1)
;C
(2)
; : : : ;C
(t)
i
in a resoure alloation setting have k agents and 2m resoures { R
m
[ T
m
for whih C
(d)
i
is haraterised by

(d)
i ;0

(d)
i ;1
   
(d)
i ;i 1

(d)
i ;i+1
   
(d)
i ;k 1
In this, 
(d)
i ;j
, indiates the subset of R
fi ;jg
[ T
fi ;jg
desribed by the 2s-bit label,

(d)
i ;j
= 
(d)
i ;j

(d)
i ;j
i.e. 
(d)
i ;j
selets a subset of R
fi ;jg
while 
(d)
i ;j
a subset of T
fi ;jg
.
It is immediate from this onstrution that for eah alloation C
(d)
inmulti() and eah
A
i
, it is always the ase that jC
(d)
i
j = (k   1)s. It follows, therefore, that the only subsets
that are relevant to the denition of monotone utility funtions with whih an analogous
result to Theorem 6 for the path multi() ould be derived, are those of size (k   1)s: if
S  R
m
[T
m
has jS j < (k 1)s, we an x u
i
(S ) as a small enough negative value; similarly
if jS j > (k   1)s then u
i
(S ) an be set to a large enough positive value.
9
Our desription in the preeding paragraphs, an be summarised in the following re-
sult, whose proof is omitted: extending the outline given above to a formal lower bound
9. It is worth noting that the \interpolation" stage used in Theorem 4 is not needed in forming multi():
the deal hC
(d)
;C
(d+1)
i is anM (k 1)-ontrat. We reall that in going from 
s
of Theorem 3 to ext(
s
)
the intermediate stage { double(
s
) { was not an O-ontrat path.
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proof, is largely a tehnial exerise employing muh of the analysis already introdued, and
sine nothing signifantly new is required for suh an analysis we shall not give a detailed
presentation of it.
Theorem 7 Let 
k
(P ;Q) be the prediate whih holds whenever hP ;Qi is an IR M (k)-
ontrat. For all k  3, n  k and m  2

k
2

, there is a resoure alloation setting
hA;R;Ui in whih every u 2 U is monotone, and an IR deal Æ = hP ;Qi for whih,
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k
) = 1 (a)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 1
)  2
bm=k(k 1)
  1 (b)
L
opt
(Æ; hA;R;Ui;
k 2
) is undened ()
4. Related Work
The prinipal fous of this artile has onsidered a property of ontrat paths realising ratio-
nal realloations hP ;Qi when the onstituent deals are required to onform to a strutural
restrition and satisfy a rationality onstraint. In Setion 2 the strutural restrition limited
deals to those involving a single resoure, i.e. O -ontrats. For the rationality onstraint
foring deals stritly to improve utilitarian soial welfare, i.e. to be individually rational
(IR) we have the following properties.
a. There are resoure alloation settings hA;R;Ui within whih there are IR realloations
hP ;Qi that annot be realised by a sequene of IR O -ontrats. (Sandholm, 1998,
Proposition 2)
b. Every IR realloation, hP ;Qi, that an be realised by an IR O -ontrat path, an be
realised by an IR O -ontrat path of length at most n
m
  (n 1)m. (Sandholm, 1998,
Proposition 2)
. Given hA;R;Ui together with an IR realloation hP ;Qi the problem of deiding if
hP ;Qi an be implemented by an IR O -ontrat path is np{hard, even if jAj = 2 and
both utility funtions are monotone. (Dunne et al., 2003, Theorem 11).
d. There are resoure alloation settings hA;R;Ui within whih there are IR realloations
hP ;Qi that an be realised by an IR O -ontrat path, but with any suh path having
length exponential inm. This holds even in the ase jAj = 2 and both utility funtions
are monotone. (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 of Setion 2)
In a reent artile Endriss and Maudet (2004a) analyse ontrat path length also onsidering
O -ontrats with various rationality onstraints. Although the approah is from a rather
dierent perspetive, the entral question addressed { \How many rational deals are required
to reah an optimal alloation?", (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a, Table 1, p. 629) { is losely
related to the issues disussed above. One signiant dierene in the analysis of rational O -
ontrats from Sandholm's (1998) treatment and the results in Setion 2 is that in (Endriss
& Maudet, 2004a) the utility funtions are restrited so that every rational realloation
hP ;Qi an be realised by a rational O -ontrat path. The two main restritions examined
are requiring utility funtions to be additive, i.e. for every S  R, u(S ) =
P
r2S
u(r);
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and, requiring the value returned to be either 0 or 1, so-alled 0   1 utility funtions.
Additive utility funtions are onsidered in the ase of IR O -ontrats (Endriss & Maudet,
2004a, Theorems 3, 9), whereas 0 1 utility funtions for ooperatively rational O -ontrats
(Endriss & Maudet, 2004a, Theorems 4, 11). Using 
max
add
(n;m;;	) and 
max
0 1
(n;m;;	)
to denote the funtions introdued in Denition 6 where all utility funtions are additive
(respetively 0 1), f. the denition of 
max
mono
, then with 
1
(P ;Q) holding if hP ;Qi is an IR
O -ontrat; 
2
(P ;Q) holding if hP ;Qi is a ooperatively rational O -ontrat and 	(P ;Q)
true when hP ;Qi is IR, we may formulate Theorems 9 and 11 of (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a)
in terms of the framework used in Denition 6, as

max
add
(n;m;
1
;	) = m (Endriss & Maudet ; 2004a;Theorem 9)

max
0 1
(n;m;
2
;	) = m (Endriss & Maudet ; 2004a;Theorem 11)
We an, of ourse, equally ouh Theorems 3 and 4 of Setion 2 in terms of the \shortest-
path" onvention adopted in (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a), provided that the domains of
utility and realloation instanes are restrited to those for whih an appropriate O -ontrat
path exists. Thus, we an obtain the following development of (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a,
Table 1) in the ase of O -ontrats.
Utility Funtions Additive 0-1 Unrestrited Monotone Unrestrited Monotone
Rationality IR CR IR IR CR CR
Shortest Path m m 
(2
m
) 
(2
m=2
) 
(2
m
) 
(2
m=2
)
Complete Yes Yes No No No No
Table 2: How many O -ontrat rational deals are required to reah an alloation?
Extension of Table 1 from (Endriss & Maudet, 2004a, p. 629)
5. Conlusions and Further Work
Our aim in this artile has been to develop the earlier studies of Sandholm (1998) onerning
the sope and limits of partiular \pratial" ontrat forms. While Sandholm (1998) has
established that insisting on individual rationality in addition to the strutural restrition
presribed by O -ontrats leads to senarios whih are inomplete (in the sense that there
are individually rational deals that annot be realised by individually rational O -ontrats)
our fous has been with respet to deals whih an be realised by restrited ontrat paths,
with the intention of determining to what extent the ombination of strutural and rational-
ity onditions inreases the number of deals required. We have shown that, using a number
of natural denitions of rationality, for settings involving m resoures, rational O -ontrat
paths of length 
(2
m
) are needed, whereas without the rationality restrition on individual
deals, at most m O -ontrats suÆe to realise any deal. We have also onsidered a lass
of deals { M (k)-ontrats { that were not examined in (Sandholm, 1998), establishing for
these ases that, when partiular rationality onditions are imposed, M (k   1)-ontrat
paths of length 
(2
2m=k
2
) are needed to realise a deal that an be ahieved by a single
M (k)-ontrat.
We note that our analyses have primarily been foused on worst-ase lower bounds
on path length when appropriate paths exist, and as suh there are several questions of
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pratial interest that merit further disussion. It may be noted that the path strutures
and assoiated utility funtions are rather artiial, being direted to attaining a path of a
spei length meeting a given rationality riterion. We have seen, however, in Theorems 4
and 5 as outlined in our disussion onluding Setion 3 that the issue of exponential length
ontrat paths ontinues to arise even when we require the utility funtions to satisfy a
monotoniity ondition. We an identify two lasses of open question that arise from these
results.
Firstly, fousing on IR O -ontrat paths, it would be of interest to identify \natural"
restritions on utility funtions whih would ensure that, if a deal hP ;Qi an be implemented
by an IR O -ontrat path, then it an be realised by one whose length is polynomially
bounded in m, e.g. suh as additivity mentioned in the preeding setion. We an interpret
Theorem 4, as indiating that monotoniity does not guarantee \short" IR ontrat paths.
We note, however, that there are some restritions that suÆe. To use a rather trivial
example, if the number of distint values that 
u
an assume is at most m
p
for some
onstant p then no IR O -ontrat path an have length exeeding m
p
: suessive deals
must stritly inrease 
u
and if this an take at most K dierent values then no IR ontrat
path an have length exeeding K . As well as being of pratial interest, lasses of utility
funtion with the property being onsidered would also be of some interest regarding one
omplexity issue. The result proved in (Dunne et al., 2003) establishing that deiding if an
IR O -ontrat path exists is np-hard, gives a lower bound on the omputational omplexity
of this problem. At present, no (non-trivial) upper bound on this problem's omplexity
has been demonstrated. Our results in Theorems 3 and 4 indiate that if this deision
problem is in np (thus its omplexity would be np{omplete rather than np{hard) then
the required polynomial length existene ertiate may have to be something other than
the path itself.
10
We note that the proof of np{hardness in (Dunne et al., 2003) onstruts
an instane in whih 
u
an take at most O(m) distint values: thus, from our example of
a restrition ensuring that if suh are present then IR O -ontrat paths are \short", this
result of (Dunne et al., 2003) indiates that the question of deiding their existene might
remain omputationally hard.
Considering restritions on the form of utility funtions is one approah that ould be
taken regarding nding \tratable" ases. An alternative would be to gain some insight
into what the \average" path length is likely to be. In attempting to address this question,
however, a number of hallenging issues arise. The most immediate of these onerns,
of ourse, the notion of modeling a distribution on utility funtion given our denitions
of rationality in terms of the value agents attah to their resoure holdings. In priniple
an average-ase analysis of senarios involving exatly two agents ould be arried out in
purely graph-theoreti terms, i.e. without the ompliation of onsidering utility funtions
diretly. It is unlear, however, whether suh a graph-theoreti analysis obviating the need
for onsideration of literal utility funtions, an be extended beyond settings involving
exatly two agents. One diÆulty arising with three or more agents is that our utility
10. The use of \may" rather than \must" is needed beause of the onvention for representing utility funtions
employed in (Dunne et al., 2003).
75
Dunne
funtions have no alloative externalities, i.e. given an alloation hX ;Y ;Z i to three agents,
u
1
(X ) is unhanged should Y [ Z be redistributed among A
2
and A
3
.
11
As one nal set of issues that may merit further study we raise the following. In
our onstrutions, the individual deals on a ontrat path must satisfy both a strutural
ondition (be an O -ontrat or involve at most k agents), and a rationality onstraint.
Fousing on O -ontrats we have the following extremes: from (Sandholm, 1998), at most
m O -ontrats suÆe to realise any rational deal; from our results above, 
(2
m
) rational
O -ontrats are needed to realise some rational deals. There are a number of mehanisms
we an employ to relax the ondition that every single deal be an O -ontrat and be
rational. For example, allow a path to ontain some number of deals whih are not O -
ontrats (but must still be IR) or insist that all deals are O -ontrats but allow some to
be irrational. Thus, in the latter ase, if we go to the extent of allowing up to m irrational
O -ontrats, then any rational deal an be realised eÆiently. It would be of some interest
to examine issues suh as the eet of allowing a onstant number, t , of irrational deals
and questions suh as whether there are situations in whih t irrational ontrats yield
a `short' ontrat path but t   1 fore one of exponential length. Of partiular interest,
from an appliation viewpoint, is the following: dene a ((m);O)-path as an O -ontrat
path ontaining at most (m) O -ontrats whih are not individually rational. We know
that if (m) = 0 then individually rational (0;O)-paths are not omplete with respet to
individually rational deals; similarly if (m) = m then (m;O)-paths are omplete with
respet to individually rational deals. A question of some interest would be to establish
if there is some (m) = o(m) for whih ((m);O)-paths are omplete with respet to
individually rational deals and with the maximum length of suh a ontrat path bounded
by a polynomial funtion of m.
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